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Full text of "Gun violence : do stolen military parts play a role? : hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, November 18, 1993"

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S. Hrg. 103-774 



4. G 74/9; S. HRG. 103-774 

jR Violence: Do Stoles Hilitarji Pa.. 






NOVEMBER 18, 1993 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 


74--127CC WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, t)C 20402 
ISBN 0-16-046015-8 

S. Hrg. 103-774 



LG 74/9; B. HRG. 103-774 

Violence: Do Stolen ttilitars Pa.. 






NOVEMBER 18, 1993 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 

^^013 . 

74-427 cc WASHINGTON : 1994 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-046015-8 


JOHN GLE>fN, Ohio, Chairman 

SAM NUNN, Georgia WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware 



DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

Leonard Weiss, Staff Director 

Betty Ann Soiefer, Counsel 

Franklin G. Polk, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk 



Opening statements: Page 

Senator Glenn 1 

Senator Lieberman 4 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Cohen 16 


Thursday, November 18, 1993 

Donna M. Heivilin, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, General 
Accounting Office; accompanied by Joan Hawkins, Assistant Director, and 
Donald Wheeler, Deputy Director, Office of Special Investigations, General 
Accounting Office 5 

Mark S. Carter, former Michigan National Guard member 21 

Detective Michael V. Vaughn, Gang Supervisor, Los Angeles Police Depart- 
ment 23 

Lieutenant General Leon E. Salomon, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, De- 
partment of the Army 33 

Alphabetical List of Witnesses 

Carter, Mark S.: 

Testimony 21 

Heivilin, Donna M.: 

Testimony 5 

Salomon, Leon E.: 

Testimony 33 

Vaughn, Michael V.: 

Testimony 23 





U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 

Washington, DC. 
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Glenn, Chairman 
of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Glenn, Levin, Lieberman, Akaka, Stevens, 
Cohen, and Bennett. 


Chairman Glenn. The hearing will be in order. I am sorry for 
the delay this morning, but we had a vote on the floor. 

Nearly 70 percent of the murders in the U.S. in 1992 were due 
to guns. Fifteen-thousand-three-hundred-and-seventy-seven people 
were killed by gunfire in 1992, 451 in the District of Colimibia 
alone, many of those within just a few blocks of where we are right 

We in the Congress have spent the past several weeks debating 
the causes of such appalling statistics, trying to fashion measures 
which would help reduce them. We have agreed to add money to 
put more police on the street. We have debated tougher sentences, 
more Federal crimes, additional housing or prisons for prisoners, 
and many other ideas. 

As we consider these measures, the entire Nation is grappling 
with the grave problem of an increasing violence in society, and our 
constituencies have told us that crime is their biggest single worry 

It is obvious that the easy availability of weapons to those with 
criminal motive is a factor in the increase of violent crime. Keeping 
sophisticated weapons out of the hands of criminals should be a top 
priority. That means, among other things, that the largest holder 
of sophisticated weapons, the military, must carry out its special 
responsibility to keep such weapons and their spare parts secure. 

GAO has found that stolen military weapons parts are readily 
availaJDle at gun shows across the country. The presence of these 
parts in open markets may be contributing to the bloodshed which 
has gripped our citizens with fear. 

We are going to hear today from a Los Angeles police detective 
who has seen this first hand, military weapons, even artillery, in 
the hands of criminals on the streets of Los Angeles. 


I have here before me just some of the parts that were picked 
up by GAO at some of the gun shows here, parts that will let a 
semi-automatic AR-15 go into fiill automatic fire, just with this lit- 
tle kit of parts here that I hold in my hand, so that you have a 
more lethal weapon, you have something that is highly prized by 
some of the gangs, and these are military parts that have gotten 
out of the military system and are out there now to be used to 
make an AR-15 into a fiiUy automatic weapon. 

The presence of these parts in open markets may be contributing 
to the bloodshed that has gripped our citizens with fear. You can 
see that these parts aren't very large. In fact, you can hold all of 
them in one hand without any problem. 

Past investigations have found that the military wasn't doing a 
very good job of keeping track of its equipment, but today we are 
not discussing the problem of just engines rusting in a field at an 
Army depot. We had a hearing on that not too long ago. The inven- 
tory problem we are looking at today has more far-reaching and 
dangerous implications for the American public, especially those 
people who live in everyday fear of gun violence. 

The small weapons parts that I just showed you here could add 
a dangerous new wrinkle to the out-of-control problem of automatic 
weapons on the street. I would hate to think Uncle Sam has be- 
come a contributor instead of the solution to this problem. 

For example, as the GAO reports, parts similar to these were sto- 
len off a military base in Michigan and sold to a national gun deal- 
er. As it turns out, this gun dealer has also been linked to the sale 
of small arms parts to the Branch Davidian religious cult in Waco, 
Texas. Could it be possible that David Koresh's arsenal was 
strengthened by stolen U.S. military parts? It could be. I don't have 
the answer to that question, but you can see that there are fright- 
ening consequences to small arms parts theft. 

At past hearings, this Committee has received numerous prom- 
ises that the Army would resolve its inventory problem. We have 
been hearing this for 3 years now, with a whole series of GAO re- 
ports. These promises that the problems are going to be solved are 
beginning to have a very hollow sound. 

The report we are releasing today is the latest in a long series 
of GAO reports on the same subject. They have given us such re- 
ports practically every 6 months, in May 1990, November 1990, Au- 
gust 1991, and March 1992. So what is being done? Why isn't 
something being done? Why haven't we corrected this particular 
problem? I certainly hope the threat of military hardware our Na- 
tion's streets changes this all talk and no action policy. 

Today we will be examining the issue of the theft of small arms 
parts at several military bases. Several General Accounting Office 
reports issued in the past 3 years have explored the problem of 
theft of small arms at military bases across the country. Following 
up on these reports, I asked the GAO to look at the steps taken 
by the Army to prevent thefts of small arms parts and evaluate 
their effectiveness. 

Today's hearing focuses on the most recent GAO report, which 
found that internal controls were deficient at the military sites 
they visited. Lax controls at military storage facilities have re- 
sulted in thefts of parts by both military personnel and civilians. 

These lax controls also raise another important question. If these 
sensitive gun parts are leaving military bases, what about other 
military supplies? We will hear about everything from batteries to 
rocket launchers being stolen. This is indicative of a major problem 
with security and with taxpayer funds just being wasted. 

Yesterday we approved the Department of Defense authorization 
bill. How much of that money is going to be used to put oil or gas 
in the cars of non-military personnel? Not only is this shocking be- 
cause of the loss of taxpayer dollars due to theft, but also because 
the GAO found that some of the parts stolen are those that are 
used to convert semi-automatic rifles into automatic machine guns. 
Those are the same automatic machine guns which we have passed 
laws to prohibit. 

A recent poll by the DeHere Foundation taken between October 
21 and 24 of this year found that 92 percent of those surveyed sup- 
ported a complete ban on semi-automatic weapons. We have just 
passed an amendment to the crime bill which prohibits possession 
even of those same semi-automatic rifles, which will be discussed 

The GAO report issued today is quite definite in its assessment 
of the military's security systems. It does not say that security sys- 
tems could be tightened. Rather, the report concludes in strong lan- 
guage that the inventory control, computer tracking systems, and 
physical security of small arms parts are so weak that the system 
appears to be out of control. Army inattention to parts control has 
led to increased availability of potentially dangerous parts and ma- 
terial with dire consequences. 

We address today the findings of the GAO and what the Army 
intends to do to call a halt to future theft. Our first panel today 
is from the GAO. We look forward to hearing fi"om Ms. Donna 
Heivilin of the GAO about the important conclusions contained in 
the report. 

We will hear from Mr. Carter, formerly of the Michigan Guard, 
who will discuss his personal knowledge of and involvement with 
the weaknesses of the supply system at the base in which he 
worked. It is ironic that at the same time the District of Columbia 
is attempting to call upon the National Guard to help stem the vio- 
lence in the streets, the Guard may well have contributed to the 
problem itself. 

We also have with us Detective Michael Vaughn of the Los Ange- 
les Police Department, as I mentioned, who has personal experi- 
ence in dealing with the effect of military weapons which hit the 
streets of L.A. 

Finally, we will hear from Lieutenant General Leon Salomon 
with the Armys response to the GAO report. 

This report today is very narrowly focused. It is a GAO report 
we requested looking into gun parts, which we have had previous 
reports on, following on whether the situation had been corrected 
or not. 

But I do not want anyone to think that we are focusing exclu- 
sively on gun parts here today because it is part of a much broader 
problem. There are larger weapons other than those going from a 
semi-automatic to an automatic weapon that may well be entering 

the black market, being sold in the country, and being given to 
gangs or being acquired by gsings. 

Even that becomes a smaller problem when you think beyond se- 
curity items like gun parts, to other items like shoes, clothing, food, 
computers, typewriters and everything else that may be going out 
the door, too. If we are having that kind of a problem with some- 
thing supposedly as secure as gun parts, then what is going on 
with all the other things that are on bases that people also can be 
stealing out? 

I also want to find out more from General Salomon since this is 
our fourth report in just about 3 years, and yet we seem to be just 
repeating the same chapter and verse. You almost could just 
change the date-time stamp on the report and repeat the same one. 

We have had a number of reports, and this Committee has 
looked into a number of the areas of waste and abuse and mis- 
handling of government equipment. We have seen programs like 
"20/20" and "60 Minutes" go into some of the warehouses and ask 
some very embarrassing questions. 

This morning we are looking beyond gun parts, to the much big- 
ger issue of what is going on with other material and why we are 
not in a position to really correct this. 

With that. Senator Lieberman, do you have any comments? 


Senator LlEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want, very briefly, just to thank you and your staff for the ex- 
traordinary work that has been done in bringing this hearing to- 
gether and to thank the folks at GAG for their characteristically 
high level of investigation and analysis. 

This hearing brings together in a way that is hard to com- 
prehend, really, two of our main concerns here in Congress this 
year, which are to ferret out waste in government and to make gov- 
ernment function more efficiently on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, to fight this outrageous wave of violent crime that is 
sweeping our country. 

The thought that our ineffectiveness at managing assets of the 
Federal Government, in this case military assets, is contributing to 
the outbreak of violent crime which threatens our security is mind- 

A lot of us have been saying in the debate on the crime bill, 
which hopefully will come to an end on the Senate floor today, that 
the American people face threats to their freedom and security 
today from criminals at home more than any that we face from for- 
eign enemies abroad. 

It is really disconcerting and a shame to think that inadequacy 
in overseeing some of these assets, these gun parts and other 
equipment, which are really the possession of the people of the 
United States is contributing to our violent crime problem. It is the 
taxpayers who bought this equipment, it is those who work in gov- 
ernment who just manage or oversee their use, who are in that 
sense trustees for what is owned by others. The thought that the 
inadequacy of management systems on the part of the military is 
contributing to a loss of security here at home is very troubling in- 

There are some allegations in the GAO report about security 
problems of the Connecticut National Guard in Hartford and Wind- 
sor Locks. I do want to say for the record that we have already had 
one outcry from the IoceJ authorities saying that there is another 
side to the story, and I will be glad to hear their case explained 
in more detail. 

In hearings before this Committee, the Army has received the 
highest compliments, particularly from the GAO and Comptroller 
General Bowsher, in terms of its management overall. That makes 
it doubly troubling to hear the very serious direct allegations made 
in the GAO report. 

I hope that this confrontation, such as it is, will lead to changes 
in behavior that will both save the taxpayers money and protect 
our citizenry from crime. 

I look forward to the testimony, and again, Mr. Chairman, I 
thank you for your leadership here. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. Senator Lieberman. 

Chairman Glenn. Our first witness this morning is Donna 
Heivilin, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, General 
Accounting Office, and with her are Joan Hawkins, Assistant Di- 
rector, and Donald Wheeler, Deputy Director, Office of Special In- 

Ms. Heivilin, we look for your testimony. Thank you for being 


Ms. Heivilin. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am 
pleased to be here today to discuss our review of the Army's protec- 
tion of small arms parts in active units and the National Guard. 
We are releasing the report today, and I am going to touch on some 
of the highlights in my statement. 

We have issued numerous reports, as you have pointed out, in 
the past on various problems in protecting DOD's inventory. We 
have reported that many thefts and attempted thefts of small arms 
parts from the military supply system, including those for the mili- 
tary M16 rifle, have been (Hscovered. The common thread in all of 
these thefts is that military personnel have been involved and the 
discovery of the thefts was accidental. 

The review I am discussing today is the third we have conducted 
in a series on the protection of small arms parts. In 1990, we 
looked at the New York National Guard and we found that its in- 
ternal controls and physical security over small arms parts was in- 
adequate to prevent theft. 

In July 1991, we reported on an examination of the small arms 
parts at four Army supply depots. We found large and consistent 
losses at the Red River Depot. At three of the four depots, we re- 
ported that the security was generally targeted toward theft by 
outsiders and not targeted toward employee theft. 

During this most recent review, we helped uncover previously 
undetected thefts of smgdl arms parts by National Guardsmen at 

the Michigan Army National Guard, one of the six active Army and 
Army National Guard sites that we examined. 

The Guardsman, who you will hear from later this morning, had 
been previously assigned to the repair parts section of the ware- 
house and admitted to us that he had stolen small arms parts for 
at least 5 years. After stealing the parts, he sold them to a national 
gun dealer who has been connected to the sale of small arms parts 
to the Branch Davidian religious sect in Waco, Texas. 

The thefts had gone undetected for years because of inattentive 
management and the lack of basic checks on the ordering and han- 
dling of parts, that is, internal controls. The lack of controls at all 
six sites we examined invite theft. 

As an indicator of the pervasiveness of these thefts is that mili- 
tary small arms parts are readily available to the public at gun 
shows across the U.S. Neither the manufacturers nor the govern- 
ment sells these parts to the public. Consequently, it is likely they 
were stolen from the military supply system or the manufacturer. 

We visited gun shows in six States to determine the availability 
of military small arms parts. In all six States, we purchased small 
arms parts, some in government packaging, including the magazine 
clip in the picture that you have before you, and in five States we 
were able to buy some or all of the six smgdl arms parts necessary 
to convert a semi-automatic civiligm rifle, the AR15, to the equiva- 
lent of a fully automatic military M16. These parts are shown in 
a picture that we are going to put up here in a minute. They in- 
clude the bolt carrier, the hammer, the trigger, the sear, the selec- 
tor, and the disconnector. 

We bought military small arms parts at 13 of 15 gun shows that 
we attended. We brought some of the parts with us today so you 
can see them, and Senator Glenn, you have some parts. Maybe we 
can make other parts available to Senator Lieberman. 

I also want to point out that we brought with us a round for the 
M16 today. It is a round that is armor-piercing. We bought this at 
one of the gun shows. We had a lot of trouble getting just one or 
two rounds. The gun dealer wanted to sell a thousand or thousands 
of rounds. They didn't want to sell one or two. When our GAG 
auditor was persistent and bought some of these other parts, then 
the gun dealer finally said, well, I will sell you one or two. I am 
going to pass this, too. You can tell that it is armor-piercing be- 
cause of the green tip. 

Chairman Glenn. Was this ammunition still in government con- 
tainers? This wasn't manufactured 

Ms. Heivilin. It was in the green U.S. Army box with the NSN 
marking on it. We didn't buy a whole box, so we don't have that 
to show you. We were told that it was from the Saudi theater, fresh 
from the Saudi theater. 

Also one of the things that I should comment to you on is that 
in buying that round, the display at the table had a metal plate 
there that showed that the round would cut cleanly through the 
metal plate, whereas the regular type of round would just damage 
the plate but it would not cut cleanly through. The plate was clear- 
ly there on display showing what this armor-piercing round would 

Considering that there are thousands of nationwide gun shows 
annually, the ready availability of these parts is alarming. One of 
the other things I brought for you to look at is copies of "Shotgun 
News". These are November issues. You can see just how many 
shows there are, how many people there are that sell, and the 
parts that we bought are advertised in some of the advertisements. 
I think I have clipped the pages with those advertisements so you 
can see that they are still readily available. 

I would like to turn now to the particular theft that we discov- 
ered at the Michigan National Guard. The thefts were discovered 
because we asked site officials to review requisitions for small arms 
parts. The site officials then became aware that some shops were 
ordering small arms parts that they were not authorized to use. 
Further investigation pointed to a Guardsman, who later admitted 
the theft. He recently plead guilty to charges of stealing govern- 
ment property. A second Michigan Guardsman who worked in the 
repair shop has also admitted to stealing small arms parts. 

We have here a chart showing how the general flow of repair 
parts in DOD is set up. The supply depots that you see there are 
the depots such as Red River Depot, which was the system that we 
reported on in 1991. The first Guardsman was assigned to the 
warehouse at an installation and the second was assigned to the 
repair shop. 

At Fort Campbell, Kentucky, one of the other sites in our study, 
the theft of about $80,000 in government property, including small 
arms parts, was discovered only because the vehicle carrying the 
stolen property from Fort Campbell was stopped for a minor traffic 
violation by off-base police. 

At all six sites we visited, basic checks to protect military small 
arms parts from theft were deficient in some form. For example, 
the thefts by the Michigan National Guardsmen remained hidden 
in part because key supply and repair duties were not separated, 
physical security was lax, and the computer system could be easily 
used to hide the theft. 

In addition, management officials at this and other sites had not 
monitored supply and repedr operations as they should have. They 
had not reviewed requisitions on a regular basis, and they did not 
ensure that the inventory was accounted for. 

None of these problems were cited as material weaknesses in the 
Financial Integrity Act reports that we reviewed. At the Georgia 
Army National Guard, we found that the Financial Integrity Act 
reports lacked supporting review or check analysis. The fact that 
the Michigan Guardsmen could steal parts for over 5 years without 
detection also raises questions about the validity of these reports. 

One of the major problems we found at five of the sites we exam- 
ined was that key duties are not separated. The Michigan Guards- 
men who stole small arms parts had access to the computer system 
that was used to order and track repair parts and physical access 
to the parts in the warehouse. As a result, he could initiate orders 
for parts in the computer and take the actual parts fi'om the ware- 
house with ease. 

Similarly, at the Georgia and Michigan guards, supply personnel 
assigned to the maintenance supply office had both record keeping 
and parts handling responsibilities. 


Finally, at repair shops at Fort Benning, Campbell, and Sill, the 
same person who was inspecting weapons for needed repairs deter- 
mined the parts that were needed and repsdred the weapons. These 
situations invite theft. 

Another problem we identified at five of the sites was that the 
reviews of requisitions for repair parts were lax and sometimes 
nonexistent. We could not tell about reviews at the sixth site, Fort 
Benning, because data wasn't available there. 

Requisitions for small arms parts are not routinely reviewed to 
determine if the orders are authorized. We found that lower-level 
repair shops requisitioned small arms parts for repairs that they 
were not authorized to do. 

At five sites where the data was available, some requisition for 
eight of the ten small arms parts that we tested were unauthor- 
ized. This indicates that parts are probably being stolen at all the 
sites we examined, since the Michigan Guardsman used this weak- 
ness to cover up his thefts. Some of the unauthorized requisitions 
were for three of the six parts needed to m£ike a fully automatic 

At all six sites, we found inventory controls were inadequate and 
sometimes nonexistent. In our review, we fi-equently found repair 
parts which were unaccounted for and inventory documentation 
that was incomplete. We found small arms parts in repair shops 
that were not authorized or on any parts list. 

As a result of our visit, personnel at Fort Sill turned in as excess 
over $37,000 in sensitive and high-dollar-value small arms parts 
that were not on any authorized parts list. 

At the Connecticut Army National Guard, we found 46 machine 
gun barrels worth over $38,000 that were not on any inventory 
records and had been stored for over 9 months. 

Inventory documentation was incomplete at three sites. Inven- 
tory adjustments at the Michigan Guard were made without any 
review or approval at a higher level. The Georgia Guard could not 
find the inventory adjustment form for us, and the Connecticut 
Guard adjusted its inventory records before the higher-level review 
and approval took place. 

Throughout our review, we found that physical security at the 
supply and repair operations we visited was, for the most part, in- 
adequate to protect small arms parts and other government prop- 
erty. Deficiencies included poor controls over access to the facilities 
and improper security of small arms parts. 

For example, employees at several sites were allowed to park 
their automobiles near open bay doors, fences had holes large 
enough for a person to crawl through, guards were not assigned to 
gates, and warehouse doors were usually left open and unattended. 
We have a picture showing a gap in the perimeter fence gate at 
the Michigan National Guard. One night in early 1992, security 
personnel caught three people entering the site through the gap 
under this gate. 

In addition, sensitive and pilferable items were frequently stored 
with other items or not properly secured. At Fort Campbell, for ex- 
ample, nine squad assault weapon barrels were outside the locked 
caged area where they should have been stored. At Fort Benning, 


rifle barrels were stacked under an open window where they could 
be stolen by anyone walking outside the building. 

We have a picture here that shows the maintenance supply area 
at the Michigan Guard where sensitive small arms parts are stored 
on the second floor behind a locked door. However, as our picture 
shows and I saw a couple of weeks ago, part of this area is open 
and can be reached by climbing on cabinets. 

Finally, I want to discuss the fact that the Army's automated 
systems can be used to hide theft. There are serious vulnerabilities 
in the computer system used by the Michigan National Guard 
which enabled the Guardsman to steal parts. For example, he had 
complete access to the system and could issue sensitive commands 
reserved for the warehouse systems manager. 

In addition, a flawed batch entry process at the site and inad- 
equate system controls aided him in manipulating small arms 
parts orders. For example, he was able to order and receive parts 
and erase the record of this transaction in the computer. There 
were many other ways he could use the computer system to steal 
small arms parts. Officials at the Michigan Guard believe that such 
system vulnerabilities could lead to theft in any Army organization 
using this system. 

In our report, we make recommendations to the Secretary of De- 
fense and the Secretary of the Army. Basically, they cover changes 
needed in the computer system plus the need to enforce their regu- 
lations dealing with the financial integrity act, physical security, 
and internal checks and controls. 

I would also like to emphasize the need for attention to the atti- 
tude. Even though the costs of the parts we are discussing today 
is not high, they can be used to create dangerous weapons. The 
people in these military organizations need to understand that this 
inventory is theirs to protect, not to take. 

Before I conclude, I would like to thank the U.S. Attorney's Of- 
fice of the Western District of Michigan and the FBI in the Detroit 
Division for their cooperation with our Office of Special Investiga- 
tion agents and our evaluators. They made this work possible. 

Also, I want to point out that locally, the Army and the Army 
National Guard units we examined have taken actions on some of 
the physical security problems that we found. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I welcome any ques- 
tions you or members of the Committee may have. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. We appreciate your tes- 

I would like to ask first, how did you select these sites? Were 
there some indications of problems at these sites, or were these 
sites selected at random? 

Ms. Heivilin. We had a hypothesis going in that if there were 
high support costs for the amount of weapons that were at a site, 
that if that was the case and there were other vulnerabilities, then 
there was opportunity for theft. However, we didn't select just sites 
that looked like that. We tried to select sites based on a geographi- 
cal dispersion. We actually selected some sites where there were 
low support costs to make sure that there wasn't a difference, and 
we selected Army units that had different missions. We selected 


Fort Sill because it was artillery, Fort Benning because of training, 
and Fort Campbell because it was infantry support. 

Chairman Glenn. Some of the bases were regular Army bases 
and some were National Guard or reserve bases, right? 

Ms. Heivilin. Right, three of each, regular Army and National 

Chairman Glenn. Was there a major difference between those 
that were regular active duty bases as opposed to National Guard? 

Ms. Heivilin. No, there wasn't. We found the same 
vulnerabilities in all of the sites we looked at. There is some vari- 
ation among every site, but we saw enough vulnerabilities to make 
us very concerned every place we went. 

Chairman Glenn. Your investigation was strictly limited to gun 
parts? Some of the testimony later will show a huge rise in order- 
ing of C and D cell batteries, for instance, just before the holidays, 
with testimony that many of these batteries wind up in kids' toys 
during the holiday season. That could be what the testimony will 
be a little bit later on. 

Did you look into things like that? 

Ms. Heivilin. No, we didn't. This kind of investigation takes a 
lot of time on the part of auditors. It is a very labor-intensive in- 
vestigation. We selected the small arms parts that you could use 
to convert to automatic weapons because we thought if there was 
anything you would want to protect and control, those kinds of 
parts are the ones that you would want to make sure weren't out 
on the street. 

Chairman Glenn. I agree with that, and I would think these 
would be among the things that would be more protected. I think 
the other things, I don't know what kind of loss of materiel we can 
expect when we get into these other areas, but it must be enor- 
mous if the security areas like weapons parts are stolen as they ap- 
parently are. 

Ms. Heivilin. We have looked before this particular study on the 
overall opportunity for theft, and we do think overall there are 
weaknesses and opportunity for theft of all the property. 

Chairman Glenn. We have had hearings on that before here, 
too, and we got into all sorts of things. Over the past, I suppose, 
3 years or so, I must have personally conducted 35 or 40 hearings 
on different things in the military, not all Army, but different mili- 
tary areas of waste. 

I think sometimes maybe our people over in the Pentagon turn 
over too rapidly. I used to think that was not the case. I used to 
think we ought to rotate as many people through so we got some 
experience over there, but I sometimes think now they are not 
there long enough. 

Here we are with four reports in 3 years and very little, if any- 
thing, having been done about it. You are just hitting the tip of the 
iceberg here, on gun parts, and I am sure we are going to want to 
look into some of these other areas a little bit later on. People 
sometimes come in over there and they put in their time there and 
they can say: "It didn't happen on their watch". 

Somebody new comes in and they are not as cognizant of what 
the testimony over here has been or what has been found before. 


so it sort of passes from one person to another without the situa- 
tion really being corrected. I don't know what we do about that, but 
I think that is one of our problems. 

In your testimony, you mention the incomplete inventory docu- 
mentation you found at all six sites. I would think that would be 
key, because unless you have an inventory showing what is sup- 
posed to be there, what the need is, what the inventory is, you 
have difficulty in tracking down what is missing, is that correct? 

Ms. Heivilin. I think that it does a number of things. It invites 
theft because the people working with the inventory know that no 
one knows exactly how much they have and so it won't be missed. 
Also, if you have a lot of inventory but you don't know you have 
a lot of inventory, you are likely to order more inventory, which 
creates some of the excesses that we have different places. 

Also, one of the things we have seen is that when policemen stop 
people that have stolen inventory at their cars, then they have 
trouble documenting that back in the base from which the inven- 
tory was stolen. The policemen might go back to the base and say, 
hey, we have apprehended this person and they had property that 
looks like its yours, and then the particular base can't verify that 
it was theirs because their inventory records aren't very good. 

Chairman Glenn. You have personally been involved, I believe, 
with several of these investigations in the past over several years, 
is that correct? 

Ms. Heivilin. Yes, I have. I have been involved in all of the ones 
that we have talked about today, the New York National Guard, 
the one in which we looked at the wholesale system and our job 
on overall theft. 

Chairman Glenn. Going back to 1990, or before that? 

Ms. Heivilin. Right. 

Chairman GLENN. Nineteen-ninety? 

Ms. Heivilin. Right. 

Chairman Glenn. In what you have seen recently, have you seen 
any improvement in inventory control or security of equipment, or 
has it gone along just about the same as what you ran into 3 years 

Ms. Heivilin. I can't say I haven't seen any improvements. 
Where we have pointed out particular physical security 
vulnerabilities at a particular site, usually the commander will 
then fix that particular thing that we point out. But that makes 
me kind of worried, because we can't be everyplace and we can't 
be pointing out everything. 

Chairman Glenn. I have just one other thing, too. You didn't ad- 
dress foreign sedes. Some of these gun parts or guns of a type like 
this, M16s and so on, we have sold literally millions of all over the 
world. Is there any indication that some of these parts are coming 
back in from non-U. S. sources? 

Ms. Heivilin. We have not seen any indication of that. That 
doesn't mean it is not happening, but we are not aware that that 
is what is happening. 

Chairman Glenn. You weren't specifically looking for stolen am- 
munition or following that lead up on this, were you? You were 
looking mainly at gun parts? 


Ms. Heivilin. We were looking mainly at gun parts. It was just 
that our GAO auditor saw so much ammunition and saw ammuni- 
tion for the M16 in government wrappings and government con- 
tainers and decided to buy some of it. 

Chairman Glenn. And they wanted to sell you 

Ms. Heivilin. He said that it was at many of the tables, and 
there were thousands of rounds. 

Chairman Glenn. And they wanted to sell you cases of ammuni- 
tion instead of singles? 
Ms. Heivilin. Right. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you. My time is up on this round. 
Senator Lieberman? 

Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Ms. HeiviHn, most of the cases of theft that you describe involve 
Army or National Guard personnel as opposed to civilians. I want 
to clarify whether you see this as largely an internal problem of 
theft or whether there is also a problem because of some of the 
carelessness that the report portrays of civihans coming on base to 
steal parts. 

Ms. Heivilin. I think there are both civilians and military per- 
sonnel involved. In the cases that we know about, both are in- 
volved. But it is a threat, in our eyes, of internal security because 
the thefts are employees. 

Senator LiEBERMAN. In other words, even the civilians are em- 

Ms. Heivilin. Right. They aren't from outside of the base. Some- 
times a person who is a civilian employee from another part of the 
base might get involved with someone who is working in the supply 
system, but they are employees of the base in the cases we have 

Senator Lieberman. So it is the rare case, at least in your inves- 
tigation, where thieves totally unassociated with the military facil- 
ity break in and steal parts because of the laxity of security there. 
Ms. Heivilin. That is right. We don't see much of that. It does 
happen and there are some incidences, but we think the major vul- 
nerability is inside. 

Senator Lieberman. OK. There is a suggestion here, and one of 
the later witnesses may be in a position to answer it, but I am curi- 
ous about your response to it. We are confronting in street crime 
today this extraordinary spread and organization of gangs operat- 
ing like the classic organized crime families, even worse in many 

My question is whether you find any indication of either gang 
members working at military facilities, either in uniform or as ci- 
vilians, or of gangs attempting to create contacts with military or 
civilian employees of the government in pursuit of acquiring gun 
parts or other weapons. 
Ms. Heivilin. We haven't seen any evidence of that. 
Senator Lieberman. You describe a National Guard study which 
concluded that there was no widespread problem with theft of 
parts. Did you ascertain the basis for that conclusion? 

Ms. Hawkins. That was just a study where when the theft in 
Michigan was identified, they sent a memo around to their Na- 
tional Guard sites and said we would like you to look at this and 


see if there is a problem. The answer came back, we don't have any 
problem. But it was not a detailed study, it was responses to a 

Senator LiEBERMAN. I see. Maybe you can clarify the reference, 
then, on page 37 of the report about the National Guard bureau 
destro3dng some documents that were part of a review. I am not 

Ms. Hawkins. That was when they got the responses to this 
memo that they sent. When the responses came back after they 
looked at it and said there is no problem, they threw away the re- 

Senator Lieberman. So you were not concerned about that docu- 
ment destruction? 

Ms. Hawkins. We would have liked to have seen those docu- 
ments. However, once they were destroyed, there wasn't much we 
could do about it. 

Senator Lieberman. Right. 

Ms. Heivilin. We would have liked to have seen the actual re- 
sponses from the various Guards, but they didn't have them. 

Senator Lieberman. But you didn't conclude that there was any 
reason to suspect the report, or were you not in a position to con- 
clude either way? 

Ms. Heivilin. We are not in a position to conclude either way. 

Senator Lieberman. Generally, you have described a kind of cli- 
mate that — and I don't mean to put words into your mouth or into 
the report, but my reading of it suggests that there is failure at the 
leadership level here to create an environment that is intolerant of 

Is that a fair description, and could you just talk about it a little 
bit more? 

Ms. Heivilin. I think it is more that they don't believe that they 
have much theft, or in the past they have not believed that there 
was much theft. 

Senator Lieberman. That the Army and National Guard leader- 
ship doesn't believe there is a serious problem? 

Ms. Heivilin. And when I say that, I am talking DOD-wide. 

Senator Lieberman. Right. 

Ms. Heivilin. When we have published reports on theft, the re- 
sponses that we have gotten back from DOD is that GAO has over- 
stated the problem, that we don't understand, that the theft is real- 
ly very small, it is not significant, it is not a problem worth the 
kind of effort that we are suggesting that they should apply to it. 

Senator Lieberman. Clearly, you would say that your findings 
generally — I must say that I am impressed by the fact that at each 
one of the gun shows you went to you found what you took to be 
real U.S. military parts. I take it the shows that you went to were 
randomly selected, there was no particular reason why they should 
have been more likely 

Ms. Heivilin. We simply selected them because they were avail- 
able during the time frame that we were going to gun shows. We 
tried to go to gun shows geographically across the United States. 

We also had the Army's experts at Rock Island, Illinois, look at 
the parts that we bought. Some of the parts we bought weren't 
military, but most of what we bought, we thought were military or 

74-427 0-94 


was represented to us as military, and the expert at Rock Island 
Arsenal said yes, they were military. To verify the parts as mili- 
tary, he looked at the markings and he looked at the particular 

Senator Lieberman. To just echo the Chsdrman, it does seem to 
me that this report really cries out for some response from the Pen- 
tagon. If, in fact, as you describe it, there is a sincere, but accord- 
ing to your own conclusions, misinformed opinion that theft of mili- 
tary parts is not a problem, it seems to me after your report the 
burden is certainly on the Pentagon to justify that conclusion, or 
their conclusion that it is not a problem, or to take aggressive ac- 
tion to stop the problem. 

Ms. Heivilin. Can I take a minute and point out, one of the 
problems in trying to stop this kind of theft is because there are 
thousands of places it can occur. The Army has the kind of units 
that we are talking about at thousands of locations across the 
world and across the United States. Also, often the stolen amounts 
are small, and the value, the absolute value, is very, very small. 
The DOD has just a finite number of investigators, and when 
they respond to us about this theft they say it isn't a major prob- 
lem because the losses that are documented in criminal investiga- 
tions are relatively small. Well, they are small because these things 
don't cost much. They are also small because it is usually a small 
amount taken over a long period of time, not like the huge amount 
that you would get if you had contract fraud or procurement fraud. 
So it takes a lot more effort to find and it is a lot harder to docu- 
ment and a lot harder to prosecute. 

Senator LiEBERMAN. That is a good point, but obviously it all 
adds up cumulatively, and even if it doesn't add up cumulatively, 
if this theft is ending up in the hands of street criminals, then it 
is having a disastrous effect on people. 

Ms. Heivilin. I think that is all the more reason that you need 
to work on the attitudes, since it is very hard to prevent all of the 
stealing that could take place in so many places, then the attitude 
towards it is probably your first line of defense. 
Senator LiEBERMAN. Thank you. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Chairman Glenn. Senator Bennett? 
Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I don't have any earth-shattering questions for the witness. I am 
impressed by her testimony. I do have an observation coming out 
of my background in the business world. If you were in retailing, 
we would call this shrinkage, and virtually every retailer knows 
that shrinkage is a problem and that more shopUfting occurs from 
employees than it does from customers. 

So every retailer sets about to put into place some kind of con- 
trols to prevent it, not because the amount of money is that large, 
although in some circumstances it can be, but because of the corro- 
sive culture that it creates among the employees if this is allowed 
to go on. 

I think in response to your question to Senator Lieberman, the 
Pentagon should be made to understand that this corrosive culture 
is worth a lot of money, not just in this circumstance but all across 
the board, in the way employees of the Pentagon, employees of the 


defense establishment respond to their jobs and their responsibil- 

If you get into this kind of a culture, this means you go home 
a half-hour early every day, and then pretty soon you are taking 
45 minutes extra for lunch. Nobody cares. It is not a big amount 
of money. The overall impact of this on the efficiency and effective- 
ness of an organization is very serious, and every management ex- 
pert who has ever studied it knows that. 

That is why retailers go to such effort to stop shrinkage, regard- 
less of the amount of money involved in the sweater that is taken 
home or the bra that is stolen or the pair of kids' shoes that dis- 
appear. It is the other thing that is far more important than the 
value of the goods. 

So I would hope out of this hearing we could send a very strong 
message that says we are not interested in a clear dollar and cent 
accounting of the monetary value of this part or that part, but we 
are very interested in the corrosive nature of the culture that says 
you can steal at random. 

This is a pervasive problem. It exists every place where people 
are employed. I once worked for Howard Hughes in the days when 
he owned the casinos, and there our inventory was cash. You can 
understand that we took shrinkage very seriously in dealing with 
gambling casinos. And once again, it was not just the cash, it was 
the mindset of our employees that said, when you work here, you 
don't steal. You don't steal time, you don't steal cash, you don't 
steal any kind of thing, except in the hotels we did encourage the 
customers to steal the ash trays because they were advertising and 
they would take them home and show them off to their friends. 

But we are not talking about ash trays here. We are talking 
about assault weapons that could get on the street, and I simply 
wanted to make this statement, Mr. Chairman, so that no one in 
the Pentagon would misunderstand if they are addressing the issue 
of the value of the things in the way you described. We are talking 
about a culture that is very important, and every other manage- 
ment organization in the country in business understands the link 
between this kind of theft and the culture, and the Pentagon ought 
to understand it, too. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. 

Senator Akaka? 

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am delighted to hear my colleague, Senator Bennett, talk about 
the corrosive culture that is so important and basic to this issue. 
By your testimony, Ms. Heivilin, you have indicated that lax con- 
trol, laxity in property inventory, and the lack of basic checks con- 
tributes to this. Also, you know that parts are missing and you 
know that it is an inside job. 

Knowing all of this, you have come across with some rec- 
ommendations. What has happened to these recommendations? 

Ms. Heivilin. For the recommendations for the current report, 
DOD hasn't had time to do anything yet except at the particular 
units we were at, when we pointed out physical security things or 
we pointed out parts that weren't under control, those things were 
taken care of usually. 


The Pentagon has started, though, to look at the computer sys- 
tem. They have sent some of their people over to talk to our com- 
puter expert and that conversation will continue to evolve. We are 
committed to helping them. We have also offered, and they have 
said they are going to take us up on, having our auditors sit down 
and talk to them about everything we saw. Obviously, we don't get 
everything into a report. We have stacks and stacks of work papers 
that have a lot more detail than what we put in the report. 

But going back to the report we did on the New York National 
Guard, there we made some recommendations in 1990. There are 
changes that still have not come out but are supposed to come out 
next month in a regulation. It seems to take an awful long time 
for that kind of thing to happen. Also, they aren't changing every- 
thing exactly the way we think they should. They are putting more 
strength in separating duties, but they talk about separation of du- 
ties between repair and supply. They are not separating duties 
within supply and within repair, which is where we saw the prob- 
lem and where we saw the stealing going on at the Michigan Na- 
tional Guard. 

Also, the implementation problem just continues. There are thou- 
sands of units, and you have to make sure that they all know about 
it and they all do it. That is a big management situation and a big 
management problem. It is going to take a lot of time and atten- 

Senator Akaka. I think you put the finger on it. What I was 
going to ask, and you probably are doing it, is for the military and 
for the Army to put emphasis on a program to prevent pilfering so 
that employees or people that belong understand that this is not 
what is accepted. 

Ms. Heivilin. It is their responsibility to protect it. 

Senator Akaka. Maybe that might help the cause. You have cer- 
tainly done well in identifying the problem and even recommending 
what should be done. I just hope that you can move swiftly on this 
with a good program to prevent pilfering. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you. 

Senator Cohen? 

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have an opening statement I would like to submit for the 

Chairman Glenn. Without objection, it will be included in the 

record in its entirety. 

Prepared Statement of Senator Cohen 

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing on the very serious prob- 
lem of the susceptibility of the Department of Defense inventory, and specifically 
gun parts, to theft. As the Chairman well knows, this is not a new issue. For years 
the Department of Defense has had systemic problems in the security of its inven- 
tories. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued a number of reports uncov- 
ering thefts and attempted thefts of small arms parts from the military supply sys- 
tem. Everything from gun parts to batteries has been stolen for monetary gain and 
Srivate use. As a result, government property has turned up in the hands of our 
fation's criminals and in the Christmas toys of the children of the unscrupulous 
individuals who stole these supplies. 

I am very concerned by the fact that we have heard before about a number of 
the very same problems we are going to discuss today. In fact, the Army's failure 
to address the problems outlined in earlier reports have contributed to the ease by 
which these subsequent thefts were committed. Time and time again the Army has 


not taken the necessary steps to put an end to this abuse. In view of GAO's earlier 
findings, I find it inexcusable that the former member of the Michigan Army Na- 
tional Guard who will be testifying today was able to steal fi*om the Federal Govern- 
ment for some 5 years before the thefts were detected. This individual stole parts 
fi"om the Federal Government and sold them to a national gun dealer in Illinois who 
has been connected to the sale of small arms parts to the Branch Davidian religious 
sect in Wado, Texas. It is particularly disturbing to think that the very weapons 
used to kill Federal agents may have been supplied by the government itself. 

We will hear today how these parts are ending up in the hands of our Nation's 
criminals. For nearly a month, the Congress has been working to address our Na- 
tion's very serious crime problem; yet, lax military controls are already at work un- 
dermining this important legislation. 

Military small arms parts are being sold at gun shows across the Nation. In five 
of six States GAO visited, GAO was able to buy some or all of the parts necessary 
to convert a semiautomatic civilian rifle to the equivalent of a fully automatic mili- 
tary M16. DOD's regulation on the disposal of property states that "small arms, 
weapons and parts are not authorized for sale to the general public except as scrap 
after necessary demilitarization is completed." Yet, these parts are readily available 
to the public at gun shows throughout the country. In some cases these parts were 
still in government packaging which included their stock number. 

The GAO report being released today certainly paints a disturbing picture: one 
in which Army facilities have lax physical security, inadequate internal controls, in- 
effective inventory accounting mechanisms, poor supervision of employees, and a 
lack of basic checks on the ordering and handling of parts — a situation which invites 
theft of government property for personal gain. Although GAO's report looks only 
at a number of Army installations, I remain very concerned about the degree to 
which similar situations may be occurring at other Army facilities throughout the 
country and within other branches of the military. 

Earlier this week, I participated in a hearing on the growing problem of criminal 
aliens in this country. Large numbers of criminal aliens do not have their deporta- 
tion proceedings completed before they complete their prison sentence and as a re- 
sult, are released back into our society. Once out on the street, these criminals are 
often notified by mail that they are going to be deported and they are given 72 
hours to report to the INS for deportation. I am sure it comes as no surprise to any- 
one in this room that large numbers of these individuals don't show up for their 
deportation. In short, the INS is running an honor system policy for convicted crimi- 
nal aliens — a policy which invites abuse. These criminal aliens are given an oppor- 
tunity to run and we should not be surprised that they often take it. 

The situation being described today by GAO and the former member of the Michi- 
gan Army National Guard presents a similar situation. The physical security at 
many of these facilities is inadequate to prevent theft. Fences with holes large 
enough for a person to crawl through, unguarded gates, and warehouse doors that 
are often left open and unattended are just a few of the security breaches GAO dis- 
covered. At Fort Benning, for example, rifle barrels were stacked under an open 
window inviting anyone walking by to steal them. Here again, we seem to be creat- 
ing a situation which invites abuse and, in this case, theft. Employees are presented 
with opportunities to steal and, as we have seen, they are taking it. In addition, 
there do not appear to be adequate controls or safeguards to prevent these thefts 
from occurring. In a situation at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, about $80,000 worth of 
government property, including small arms parts, was discovered as it was being 
stolen only because the vehicle was stopped for a minor traffic violation by oflF-base 

Mr. Chairman, the specific problems at the Army installations and the ways that 
employees have been stealing government property are too numerous to go into fur- 
ther in this opening statement. Let me just say that the Federal Government has 
a responsibility to do better and it must do better. We must prevent theft of govern- 
ment property and the use of military weapons to commit crimes. While I am aware 
that the Army has made some changes in an eff"ort to begin to correct this situation, 
it is clear that it has not done enough. If the Army is unwilling or unable to address 
these very serious problems, then I stand ready to assist you, Mr. Chairman, in im- 
plementing changes so that we are not called back here in anther 2 or 3 years to 
hear stories similar to the ones we are going to hear today. 

Senator Cohen. I will offer a couple of comments and questions. 

I take it very little follow up has been done since the initial GAO 
report and its recommendations were issued back in 1990. We have 
basically the same situation today that we had in 1990? 


Ms. Heivilin. Yes, we do. 

Senator COHEN. I think you expressed it in terms of an attitu- 
dinal problem. 

Mr. Chairman, this is more than a few thousand bullets or a few 
thousand batteries making their way out into the civilian circula- 
tion. As Senator Bennett has said, we are talking about parts for 
assault weapons as well. It has to do with more than simply leak- 
age or shrinkage, it has to do now with national security, because, 
I expect, this is not confined to the National Guard alone. 

Do individuals have a different mindset within the National 
Guard as opposed to being in the military full time. We have civil- 
ians moving from civilian life into soldiering and back out into ci- 
vilian life again. 

Ms. Heivilin. We didn't see any difference. 

Senator Cohen. You saw no difference? The reason I ask this 
question is I noticed in today's Washington Post, page A3, a very 
significant headline, "Justice Department Urges Pentagon Not to 
Purchase Cop-Killer Bullets". We have the Attorney General of the 
United States calling upon the Secretary of Defense not to pur- 
chase armor-purchasing bullets for nine-millimeter handguns be- 
cause of the fear that these particular armor-piercing bullets will 
be used to kill policemen who are wearing armor-protective vests. 

This is more than just a few thousand bullets getting out into the 
mainstream of commercial life. We are talking now about civilian 
agencies asking the defense agencies not to purchase the kind of 
weaponry or ammunition that may be necessary to save our sol- 
diers' lives. We are setting up a dynamic, or a conflict, between the 
needs for a national security protecting our soldiers' lives — and pro- 
tecting our civilian lives. 

This is not something that can be easily dismissed. It is very se- 
rious. The fear is we have lost control. 

Earlier this week, I participated in a set of hearings dealing with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We have, as I recall, 
something like 450,000 criminal aliens in the country, and we don't 
know where they are. We don't even know who they are. We have 
a situation in which those who are illegally in this country have 
committed crimes, been sent to prison to complete their sentences, 
are released, and they are often given a notice by mail that they 
have 72 hours to get their affairs in order before they are deported. 

Does it come as any surprise that most of them never show up? 
Last year in New York alone, 87.7 percent of those ordered to be 
deported did not show up for their deportation. We don't know who 
they are as they use aliases or different social security numbers. 
We lack the technology, the internal controls and the personnel to 
locate them. The problem is not identical to what we have here, but 
both represent dysfunctional systems. 

Now it may be that the Army personnel who have come to testify 
will dispute the GAO's findings. It may be that the situation is 
being magnified beyond the nature of the problem. I think you 
would agree that we can expect some leakage or shrinkage no mat- 
ter how many controls are put into effect. That is the nature of 
human beings There will be some pilfering. 

But the question is, can we hold it down to a bare minimum, and 
what changes are necessary, £ind at what expense, to prevent the 


kind of hemorrhaging that appears to be the case here. Or, at a 
minimum, how can we Hmit the opportunity for hemorrhaging. 
When I look at some of the photographs or read the testimony of 
how easy it is to steal certain items, it calls into question whether 
or not we have to have a change in attitude. 

It is not a matter of small change or small potatoes. It is not just 
a few thousand bullets floating around ending up in Waco, Texas. 
I believe it is far more serious, because now it has extended to our 
Justice Department calling upon the Defense Department not to 
purchase a type of bullet that can, in fact, save the lives of our 
servicemen and women but also kill our police officers on the 
streets. That is how serious the problem has become. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you. You raise a good point. I hadn't 
seen that report in the paper this morning. Senator Cohen, but 
that is very interesting. Apparently they either don't want them to 
be manufactured at all or they feel there is going to be so much 
leakage of ammunition out of the Defense Department that it is 
going to be a factor in our national crime. It is a tragedy when we 
get to that point. 

I have just a couple of additional questions. First, where in the 
system is the main loss? Is it the warehouse, the depot, or the local 
repair shop where the weapons are actusdly being repaired? 

Ms. Heivilin. We can't tell that, because it isn't possible to do 
the kind of job that would identify that. You would have to 

Chairman Glenn. Are the records complete enough that you 
could even do that? 

Ms. Heivilin. Probably not. We certainly do know how m£iny ad- 
justments there are in inventory, and in the past, when we have 
looked at something in a particular maintenance depot, for in- 
stance, we have seen up to 18 percent inventory unaccounted for. 

Chairman Glenn. Eighteen percent? 

Ms. Heivilin. Yes. 

Chairman Glenn. In gun parts? 

Ms. Heivilin. No, I am talking about all inventory. 

Chairman Glenn. All inventory, 18 percent. 

Ms. Heivilin. Yes. But we don't know the answer to your ques- 

Chairman Glenn. All right. I gather you have not tried to ex- 
trapolate the results of this investigation and multiply it by the 
number of centers and repair places all over the country. You 
didn't try to do that, did you? 

Ms. Heivilin. I don't know how to do that. This isn't the kind 
of study for which you can draw a statistical sample and general- 

Chairman Glenn. Is it your opinion that the same or greater lev- 
els of theft probably occur with regard to other items, for anything 
that is useful or saleable, such as the batteries that we will have 
testimony on later? I was impressed with that. I think the state- 
ment in one of the copies of advance testimony received said some- 
thing about $25,000 worth of C and D batteries just happened to 
be ordered in November just to meet the Christmas holiday season 
when all the kids' toys need batteries and so on. 

I don't know whether that is a valid assumption or not, but 


Ms. Heivilin. I would guess that the same amount of theft is 
going on in every area. 

Chairman Glenn. OK. Do you happen to know whether any of 
these bases use a gate check procedure? When I was in the mih- 
tary, and I was in for quite a while in the Marine Corps, 23 years, 
occasionally they would have gate checks back in those days. You 
just took at random, you took every third or fifth car and pulled 
it over when people were leaving the base. That car got a good 
going over. If there was anything that was government equipment 
in that car, you were in deep trouble. That seemed to keep things 
pretty well under control, because people who had things in the 
trunk or in the car were dealt with very harshly. 

Did any of these bases have that kind of a check procedure, so 
far as you know? 

Ms. Heivilin. None of them had what you are talking about, 
where they would stop random cars and they would open up the 
trunks and look at them. Generally, that doesn't happen on most 
of the bases. I know it does happen on some of the bases. When 
we examined Red River and we saw all of the problems there, they 
weren't doing gate checks at that time. When we asked them about 
it they said that it would be difficult, it would be hard on the em- 
ployee morale. We pointed out that they could pull the cars over 
and not cause a line to form, and they did start doing that. 
Chairman GLENN. Employee morale, my foot. 

Ms. Heivilin. That is the answer we also get about 

Chairman Glenn. I wouldn't worry necessarily about employee 
morale. I am trying to worry about the taxpayers here, too. 

Ms. Heivilin. We get the same answer when we point out that 
cars shouldn't be parked up against the warehouses. They say it 
would cause employee morale problems if employees had to walk 
several blocks. 

Chairman Glenn. In these random searches, I have been pulled 
over at the main gate and my car gone through just like everybody 
else. It hurt my morale, too, but it also helped cut down on waste 
coming out of the base— not that I had any in my car, understand. 

Ms. Heivilin. I do know that it happens at some bases, but it 
didn't at the ones that we were looking at. 
Chairman Glenn. OK, thank you. 
Senator Cohen, do you have any other questions? 
Senator COHEN. Is that part of your recommendations, that we 
include that? 

Ms. Heivilin. Part of our recommendations is that they make 
sure that their security regulations are implemented, and the secu- 
rity regulations say that there should be spot checks at the gate. 
Senator COHEN. Thank you. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. We may 
have additional questions for you. We would appreciate a prompt 
response to any additional questions so we can include them in the 

Again, we appreciate your being here. I am sorry that we are re- 
visiting this for the fourth time now in just your own reporting on 
this particular issue. 


Chairman Glenn. We have two people on our second panel, 
Mark Carter, a former Michigan National Guard member, and De- 
tective Michael Vaughn, Gang Supervisor, Los Angeles Police De- 

Mr. Carter, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it. Please 
give us your experience as a Michigan National Guard member. 
You were involved with this yourself, I believe, and were appre- 
hended doing some of the things that GAO found. You are awaiting 
sentencing now, I believe, so you have had some personal experi- 
ence with this. 


Mr. Carter. Yes sir. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commit- 
tee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify about the secu- 
rity of small arms parts in the Michigan National Guard. 

Chairman Glenn. Pull those mikes up real close if you can so 
everybody can hear, or speak a little more loudly there if you 
would, please. 

Mr. Carter. I was a member of the Michig£ui National Guard 
from August 1982 until April 1992, for almost 10 years. I spent 
many of those years as stock control supervisor for class nine re- 
pair parts. Those are the parts used to repair vehicles, weapons, 
and aircraft, such as bolts, barrels, and batteries. 

I was responsible for the input and output of the computer sys- 
tem which kept track of all inventory in the warehouse of those 
parts, and I reconciled the records of the two computer systems to 
each other. I kept the data flowing dnd supervised the office staff 
which processed all requisition orders for those parts. This included 
handling of all requisitions for 126 Guard units in the State. 

There were ten employees in the chain of command, including 
the chief warrant officer, who was our OIC, officer in charge. There 
were approximately four people who worked under me. 

Around 1987, I started to experience severe financial difficulty. 
My house was foreclosed on. Around that same time, I decided I 
wanted to build a rifle for my own use, but I didn't have all the 
parts. I happened to go to a gun show and I didn't have the money 
to buy the parts I needed, but I had extra parts at home which I 
had taken from the National Guard. I took those extra parts to the 
show and sold them to purchase the parts I needed to put my rifle 

Once my rifle was done, I realized I could sell the rifle and make 
a profit or I could sell the parts I was t£iking from the base. I start- 
ed to do both of these things. 

I got the parts very easily. I had complete access to the computer 
system and there was no one checking on what I did or what our 
actual inventory or invoices were. So I created false requisitions, 
filled them, and took the parts. The requisitions and inventory 
were only reconciled quarterly. On a monthly basis, there was sup- 
posed to be a reconciliation by sending a statement to the cus- 
tomer, that is the individual unit, yet the customers were not re- 
quired to respond and a request on one statement would not ap- 
pear on the next statement. So if the customer didn't keep the 


records, match them to their request, and notify us, they would 
never know if there was a discrepancy. 

I also was able to get parts from turn-ins by direct support units. 
Those units would turn over overstocked small arms parts £ind not 
request any receipt. I could then just walk away with them or I 
could give them a receipt and throw the original in the trash. 

There were also times when the depot sent more items than were 
ordered. For example, the depot might send 120 bolts where only 
100 were ordered. Since there was no reconciliation between our of- 
fice and the depot, I could just take the difference and change our 
record. I could also indicate the shipment was short when it wasn't 
and take the difference. 

The even easier part was taking the parts home. Physical secu- 
rity on the base was a joke. They knew me, so I was never stopped. 
There were never any kinds of checks on us. I just drove home with 
whatever I wanted. 

At this point, I want to say something about the atmosphere at 
the base with regard to security. I am not saying this to excuse my- 
self, because what I did was wrong, but I think it is important for 
you to know that everyone there was either taking supplies or 
knew about it. I don't just mean small arms parts, although there 
was a tremendous amount of theft there, but also any parts that 
could be used privately. 

For example, we shipped $25,000 worth of C and D cell batteries 
in 1 year, with the bulk going in November and December. I know 
of a lot of kids whose Christmas toys had military batteries run- 
ning them. 

There were also some guys I know of who started a race car team 
with Army supphes. They got their tires, windshield wiper fluid, 
and oil courtesy of the government. It was just not unusual for peo- 
ple to do stuff like that. The attitude was like kids in a candy store 
who could get anything they wanted. 

I also know of one guy who wrote a computer software program 
that would allow him to send us a diskette and listing where the 
total number of requests on the diskette would match but the re- 
quests on the diskettes were different in stock number and in 
quantity from the listing. When the diskette was processed, it was 
erased, wiped clean, destroying the evidence. 

We were audited two times in the 10 years I was in the Guard. 
The first time was around 1984. It was an in-house auditor, and 
we all covered for each other and got a clean bill of health. 

The second time was more recently, in 1991 or 1992, and the 
auditor was from the Guard Bureau. He came in, chatted, and 
asked for a list of items to look at, so we gave him a list and he 
checked our paper against the inventory in the warehouse, and of 
course it matched. 

In my 10 years with the Michigan National Guard, there was 
never any serious attempt to look at our accounting system or our 
records. When GAO came in, that was the first time anyone really 
looked at what we were doing. 

You might want to know what was happening to the parts that 
were stolen by people like me. There is a black market network 


across the country which buys stolen small arms parts from dif- 
ferent National Guard units, then they sell the stolen parts at gun 
shows and through gun magazines and newspapers. 

That concludes my prepared statement. Again, thank you. Sen- 
ator Glenn, for the opportunity to testify. I want to apologize to you 
and to the Michigan National Guard for my illegal activities. I hope 
that my testimony here today will be of some help to you in stop- 
ping other people from being able to do what I did. I would be 
happy to answer Einy questions you might have. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much, Mr. Carter. I appre- 
ciate your testimony. 

Before we get to questions, we will hear from Detective Michael 
Vaughn, who is in the gang supervision or investigation depart- 
ment, I guess, gang supervisor might not be quite the right title. 
Is that your title? 

Mr. Vaughn. Pretty close, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. You are a gang investigation supervisor, from 
the Los Angeles Police Department. 

Detective Vaughn, we are glad to have you with us and look for- 
ward to your testimony. 


Mr. Vaughn. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, members of the 
Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the issue 
of parts stolen from active and reserve military instEdlations. 

I have been a Los Angeles police officer for over 25 years. I began 
investigating street gangs in 1971. In 1978, I accepted the addi- 
tional assignment of investigating outlaw motorcycle gangs, and in 
1983, another additional assignment of investigating prison gangs. 

Currently, I am a detective supervisor in the g£ing information 
section. I am currently the department's expert on prison, street 
gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. I have qualified in Federal, 
superior, municipal, and civil courts as an expert and have given 
expert testimony to Federal and county grand juries in Los Ange- 

I have written a department training pamphlet and co-written 
manuals for other agencies, and I have read training manuals for 
foreign. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies relating 
to gang investigations. 

I am the principal trainer for the department and have trained 
numerous foreign, State, Federal, and local law enforcement offi- 
cers, as well as being instructor for the Los Angeles Police Acad- 
emy, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Academy, State and commu- 
nity colleges, and other training seminars. 

Being a member of five investigative associations, I am regarded 
as an authority amongst my peers. 

Additionally, having over 26 years of service with the Army Na- 
tional Guard, I retired in 1990 at the rank of Command Sergeant 
Major. Being a Vietnam veteran, I have served in a variety of as- 
signments, including the scouts, military police, as well as the 
mechanized infantry. My last assignment was the post command 
sergeant major at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Los 
Alamitos, California. 


My testimony this morning evolves around military weapons, ex- 
plosives, ammunition, and parts that make their way from military 
installations into the hands of the criminals on the streets of our 

There are no hard statistics readily available to me to present to 
you this morning. However, I can say that law enforcement encoun- 
ters with military munitions and weaponry are all too frequent and 
routinely included in our training programs. 

The past 22 years investigating gangs has produced thousands of 
investigations, countless arrests, and an innumerable amount of 
hours on surveillance. I have authored in excess of 100 search war- 
rants and participated in, planned, and served many others. 

My investigations have led to the recovery of military weapons, 
explosives and ammunition, and spare parts as well as other mili- 
tary hardware. Heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, automatic 
rifles, semi-automatic pistols, grenades, detonation cord, plastic ex- 
plosives, land mines. Claymore mines, ammunition, and spare 
parts are just a few examples of what has been recovered in our 
cities at the hands of the criminal elements of our society. 

It has been my experience that the military hardware on our 
streets is used as a commodity. These weapons or parts are traded 
for narcotics, which are in turn sold on the streets at a profit. In 
other cases, the theft and sale of these items is an industry into 
itself, with criminals who specialize in military hardware. In still 
other cases, they become available at a premium price to gang 
members for use in their criminal endeavors, rival gang warfare, 
or in some cases against police and government agencies. 

All too often, white supremacists, survivalists, organized criminal 
organizations, subversive groups, and gang members have stock- 
piled military hardware that surpasses anything available to local, 
State, and Federal law enforcement agencies. We recover grenades, 
explosive, and booby traps that are in themselves a danger by their 
mere existence. Automatic weapons and heavy machine guns either 
have no history or have been reported destroyed by the mihtary 
have also been discovered. 

Military explosives, heavy weapons, grenades, rocket launchers, 
mortars, and automatic weapons have no legitimate use in our soci- 
ety and pose a threat to law enforcement and citizens alike. 

We recently monitored a gun show where enough parts can be 
purchased to assemble the M16 automatic rifle and the Colt 
M1911-.45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, as well as bombs and 
booby traps. Many of these parts are still packaged in military 
crates, their original Cosmoline packaging, and available in unbe- 
lievable quantities. Virtually truck loads of parts are readily avail- 
able for purchase. Training ammunition is sometimes unavailable 
to troops but can be purchased by civilians in any amount. Case 
upon case of this clearly-marked military ammunition sits stacked 
on the floor, available to cash customers. 

One has to ask the question of why this military hardware 
makes its way onto our streets. Greed is the most obvious answer. 
There is a ready market that pays in hard cash for military hard- 
ware. Gang members and other criminal elements are members of 
the regular military services as well as reserve and National Guard 
units. Many are recruited into the military by personnel who are 


under pressure to produce numbers and less likely to adequately 
check personal backgrounds. 

Many are lured into drug-related crimes as well as gang-related 
criminal activities after being introduced in the military service, 
and there is also the unscrupulous individual trying to make a fast 

I have had gang members and other criminal elements in my 
own units, as well as having arrested and investigated many mem- 
bers of the military. I routinely liaison with many military inves- 
tigators who share their frustration with me at having gang mem- 
bers and criminals in their installations. Narcotics and gang vio- 
lence are no longer strangers to life on military posts throughout 
the world. 

This, however, does not answer the question of how these weap- 
ons make their way from military reservations onto the streets. It 
has been my personal experience while in the military in a variety 
of assignments that the military lacks adequate controls to prevent 
theft. Internal and external security at military installations is 
sorely deficient and unable to prevent these losses. It was not un- 
common to see weapons reported lost or missing, written off as 
damaged or surveyed for spare parts. There is little or no audit 
trail on spare parts, as they have no identifiable numbers and have 
no part-for-part exchange rate. 

When theft or loss is discovered, reserve and National Guard 
units have ineffective or no investigative resources available to 
them. There is little follow-up investigation on thefts, missing, or 
reportedly destroyed weapons. 

As an example, we recovered two fully operational M60 machine 
guns in a narcotics deal. Both of these weapons had been reported 
destroyed by the Marine Corps several years prior, but there was 
no supporting documentation to tell us who and where. 

Military reservations and installations have poor internal and ex- 
ternal security. I have seen inadequate perimeter and building se- 
curity as well as storage security. Private security companies are 
routinely hired to provide security at reserve instedlations and lack 
adequate training. Military police at installations all too often lack 
adequate police training and search techniques to prevent theft. 

In short, there are not enough controls exercised by the military 
and inadequate records to trace^ recovered military weapons, explo- 
sives, and spare parts. 

Having both a long military and police background, I feel quali- 
fied to state that the military lacks introspection. They are under- 
standably concerned with readiness and training. Defense of this 
Nation by a well-trsiined, well-armed military is of the utmost im- 
portance. It is, however, important that they be reminded that they 
exist, live, and train in a country that is not at war and in a society 
that is, in general, not hostile. 

The same people they have sworn to protect are in many cases 
victimized by their failure to control the weapons of war. This lack 
of concern is all too often measured in a loss of human life in a so- 
ciety that is already burdened with uncontrolled violence. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. 


Mr. Vaughn. I welcome any questions from you, Mr. Chairman, 
or members of the Committee. 
Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 
Mr. Carter, where do you think most of the losses are occurring, 
in the repair shop where the actual repairs are being made, or de- 
pots, warehouses, where in the system are the greatest losses, or 
is it all of the above? 

Mr. Carter. All of the above, sir. They filter out from every place 
they touch. 

Chairman Glenn. Are these the kinds of parts, like those I have 
here, that you were taking out and selling? 

Mr. Carter. Or similar, sir. A lot of those smaller parts aren't 
really worth a great deal of money, no incentive. The large part, 
the bolt carrier on the right, your left there, is worth approximately 
$20, $25 cash. 

Chairman Glenn. What was the value of material you took out 
and sold? Do you have any estimate of that? 

Mr. Carter. I have no exact figure. I am guessing between 
$5,000 and $10,000. The GAO figure is between $20,000 and 

Chairman Glenn. You mentioned that "everyone is doing it", in 
sort of a general reference, referring not just to gun parts them- 
selves, but to looking as though government equipment or GFE is 
their property to be taken if they can get away with it, is that 

Mr. Carter. In the 10 years that I worked there, I did a running 
figure in my head of the value of stuff that went out the door, not 
necessarily myself but just stuff that I saw leave that didn't go 
where it was supposed to, and the figure is somewhere between 
$300,000 and $500,000. 
Chairman Glenn. Just off this one base? 
Mr. Carter. Just off the area I worked. 
Chairman Glenn. And that would be what, all kinds of gun 


Mr. Carter. Repair parts. 

Chairman Glenn. The batteries you talked about. 
Mr. Carter. If you are looking at, say, just strictly C and D cell 
batteries, $25,000 a year, 10 years, $250,000 right there. Auto- 
mobile batteries, tires, alternators, generators, starters, carbu- 
retors, rope, nuts and bolts, light bulbs, windshield wipers, on and 
on and on, anything you could use at home or anywhere else. 

Chairman Glenn. Was there ever any check made at the gate or 
any attempt made to stop such pilfering. Was it not known that 
such pilfering was going on? 

Mr. Carter. I can't imagine that it wasn't known because of the 
great number of people involved in it. Everybody helped themselves 
in one way or another to something. 

As far as being stopped at the gate, the gate was just open all 
day. You could drive in and out. There was no gate guard. You 
could come into work before anyone else got there or you could stay 
after everyone else left, and at lunchtime there usually wasn't any- 
one around anyway. Most of the things that I took out the door 
were done during working hours because I didn't want to come in 


on the weekend if I didn't have to. This was all during business 

Chairman Glenn. You said there were only two audits in 10 

Mr. Carter. Yes sir. 

Chairman Glenn. And they didn't mean anj^hing, obviously, 
from what your testimony indicated. Is that customary at most 
bases now, that you wouldn't have a supply inventory except a cou- 
ple of times in 10 years? 

Mr. Carter. I am not sure how it is in other bases. I know in 
our area and the areas I looked at, there are organizations we sup- 
ported that never saw any type of activity like that, never had an 
audit at all in the 10 years that I was there. Our activity was a 
little more high-profile, and the reason, I guess, that we didn't have 
more audits was because there are so few people out there that 
knew how to do it in our area. 

Chairman Glenn. Mr. Vaughn, you have had experience on both 
sides of this. You have been in the military, you have seen some 
of this theft happening. You said you actugdly have arrested people 
in the military for some of these same things in addition to having 
police experience outside. 

What is the best way to stop this, gate checks? That is not the 
only answer to this, I am sure, but what else can we do? 

Mr. Vaughn. That is an excellent question, Senator. I think se- 
curity, especially in the military, does tend to lead towards prob- 
lems in our society. I think there is a general attitude that if we 
don't have enough, we can order more, and I think there is a gen- 
eral lack of consciousness of the danger and how a military person 
or the military itself would look at routine tools of the trade. 

They lack the understanding of v.'hat happens to those things 
when they reach the street in the hands of individuals involved in 
criminal activity. The thought of driving down the street in a black- 
and-white police vehicle and facing a rocket or a heavy machine 
gun is something that keeps me awake at night. I don't think they 
have that thought process. 

Chairman Glenn. As I indicated in my opening statement, I am 
concerned, obviously, about the gun parts that we have displayed 
right here that may add to greater danger for police and for law 
enforcement officers, wherever they may be. But I am also con- 
cerned that this may be indicative of much wider stealing or pilfer- 
ing from the government, as Mr. Carter indicates, whether it is 
batteries or rope or windshield wipers or fluid or whatever. 

I would like your view of that. You were in the military also. Do 
you think that it is as prevalent as Mr. Carter indicates? 

Mr. Vaughn. I think in general it is. You gentlemen probably 
have a better understand in recent articles of what has been miss- 
ing from the government, overstocked or straight waste. When you 
go to these gun shows or you travel to swap meets, you can vir- 
tually see just about any military hardware available. Criminal or- 
ganizations have been reported to have a variety of different types 
of weapons. Some even claim that they can produce armored mili- 
tary vehicles for the right amount of cash. 


Chairman Glenn. Is this organized enough that you can go to 
any of these gun shows and order what you want and they will get 
it for you? 

Mr. Vaughn. My personal experience doesn't go in that area so 
much. I have talked to investigators with the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms on a weekly basis, and I have been to many 
intelligence briefings. I think if you have the money, you can find 
the contact to buy virtually just about anything you want, if you 
have the cash to pay for it. 

Chairman Glenn. Mr. Carter, do you think it is that organized 
that you can just order what you want? 

Mr. Carter. Yes sir. There are shows that I have been to where 
that is the case. As a matter of fact, there was one gentleman that 
I was working with that basically gave me a shopping list and said, 
this is what I need, how soon can you get it? They were very spe- 
cific about what they wanted to satisfy the demands of the market. 
If you went to the right person there at the show and put in a re- 
quest for something in particular, it would just be a short matter 
of time before that was carried out. 
Chairman Glenn. My time is up. 
Senator Cohen? 

Senator Cohen. Mr. Carter, did you see a theft of grenades and 
Claymore mines? 
Mr. Carter. Negative. 
Senator Cohen. Plastic explosives? 

Mr. Carter. No, we worked strictly with repair parts in our 
area. There was stuff Hke that that filtered out from the Guard 
units, but as a rule, it was usually ammunition and other types of 
pyrotechnic devices. Most of those were taken for amusement pur- 
poses for the people involved. 

Senator Cohen. Was there a sense that because you were a 
Guard unit as opposed to a part of the uniformed services, full-time 
that there was greater laxity? Were there less strict standards im- 
posed upon you as a civilian? 

Mr. Carter. Actually, I was fiill-time with the National Guard 
and I have been full-time with the Army as well. This is part of 
13 years of active duty. The attitudes weren't that much different, 
from what I have observed. The National Guard unit I was in was 
a bit more relaxed. Most of the units I worked with were fairly well 
relEixed, some to the point of unconsciousness. I don't know that it 
would be any different on an active Army post. 

Senator COHEN. Now you don't strike me as being a master 
criminal type. Senator Glenn and I have sat through many hear- 
ings on this Committee. We have had chop-shop criminals come in 
and teach law enforcement officials how they get into cars in a 
matter of seconds and take them out and chop them up within just 
a few minutes as a means of educating the police and the manufac- 
turers, as to how to deter this type of activity. 

I assume that you could give some pretty easy recommendations 
to prevent the kind of small-time, if you will, pilfering that takes 
place or took place with you. There are a lot of very creative people 
and minds in the military as there are elsewhere. Is it your judg- 
ment that as soon as we put a computerized system in place as 


GAO has recommended, there would be those who would find cre- 
ative ways to evade that? 

Mr. Carter. Quite possibly. If you run a computer supply system 
or any kind of computer system with the military, you want cre- 
ative people around you. It makes your job a lot easier. You want 
honest creative people. 

As far as the computer progrsims that would help account for 
where stuff went, like a history record, some type of transaction 
history on computer that would let you know what happened and 
when it happened and who did it, that would definitely make a big 
difference. Better physical security would have stopped 99 percent 
of everything that I did. If you can't get it out the gate, there is 
no point in taking it. 

But the mindset on a lot of the leadership in the Guard where 
I was at was basically look the other way, it doesn't really hap- 

Senator COHEN. There has been some reference made to morale. 
What if you had a situation where you had the base commander 
held strictly accountable? For example, if you had an investigative 
SWAT team come in periodically to various facilities and run 
through a check to determine the strength or laxity of the security 
requirements and hold the base commander accountable. Would 
that improve morgile? 

Mr. Carter. I am not sure what the effect was. If I 

Senator Cohen. It would improve security, never mind morale, 
it would improve security. 

Mr. Carter. It couldn't hurt. The first thing they would attempt 
to do would be to cover it all up. As a matter of fact 

Senator Cohen. Cover it up how? 

Mr. Carter. In whatever way, shape, or form they could. 

Senator Cohen. I am talking about having a real investigative 
SWAT team go in unannounced and make periodic "sweeps" to find 
out what kind of regulations are in effect and what security meas- 
ures have been taken or not taken. 

Mr. Carter. That would probably work. 

Senator Cohen. How are they going to cover that up? 

Mr. Carter. No, I guess I misunderstood your question. A little 
bit of that would go a long way toward creating the right mindset 
to make sure that things are complied with, most definitely. 

Senator Cohen. Mr. Vaughn, as I listened to you, I jotted down 
"Miami Vice". We are always talking about television and the im- 
pact of television. Is art imitating life or is life imitating art. I used 
to watch some of these programs, still do occasionally, and have 
thought what a preposterous caricature of life, the notion that 
somehow somebody can order a truck full of anti — TOW missiles or 
Claymore mines. It seems preposterous, just Hollywood or the net- 
works trying to promote something that is not, in fact, true. 

Then I listen to you, and there is a lot of credibility that one can 
attach now to these various programs. In fact, it seems easy for 
those of a corrupt mind to indeed sell these small arms parts for 
substantial profits. 

I will take a second look at the programs to find out whether 
there is any basis of truth, but you make it sound awfully easy that 
these parts are getting out into the civilian marketplace. 


The question I have is should we prohibit the sale of miUtary 
weaponry at a commercial level? I know I am going to get a lot of 
mail on this, but the question is, is that a policy this country 
should adopt? 

Mr. Vaughn. I don't know if I should answer that and still be 
able to go back to work. 

I think, first of all, that I should clarify that the violence and the 
weaponry, that the routine, everyday street gang member has. 
Military weaponry plays a small, a very small part in what is 
available. They can purchase much better weaponry on the street 
at a much cheaper price than looking for the military hardware. 

The thing I do want to make clear is that it is all available. It 
is all out there, it is all being used and being seen. 

Senator Cohen. Can you purchase Claymore mines out on the 

Mr. Vaughn. Not on a routine basis, but you can find the indi- 
vidual that will supply you with military explosives of a variety of 
kinds. The average street g£uig member wouldn't be trained in that 
and how to use it, but we do recover them occasionally in our 
search warrants and various raids. Mostly being used and stock- 
piled by your non-traditional type organized crime, motorcycle 
gangs and other groups, for inter-gang warfare as opposed to used 
against the police department. But those items in themselves are 
inherently dangerous. They have a history of bad things happening 
when you play with them. 

As far as the 

Senator Cohen. I just want to clarify the point. Is it a substan- 
tial problem that large amounts of military hardware is, in fact, 
ending up in the hands of gang members, or is it a small fraction? 
Which is it? 

Mr. Vaughn. It is available. Large amounts of military hardware 
are available. They are not available on the street comer to the av- 
erage individual criminal. You get into your more sophisticated or- 
ganized groups, yes. Some of your survivalists and those type of or- 
ganizations have a tremendous amount of the military hardware 
available. But it is not sold on the street comer per se to the aver- 
age gang member. Some of it — and a lot of it does wind up in their 
hands through thefts or through sales at gun shows by people that 
don't really realize what they are doing. 

Senator Cohen. I guess the question I really have, and I will end 
here, Mr. Chairman, but if you have, for example, a legitimate gun 
dealer, and you have indicated before that sometimes you find he 
or she would have a military weapon still in the package, un- 

Mr. Vaughn. That in itself would be illegal. 

Senator Cohen. OK. 

Mr. Vaughn. Those are the types of things — you are not going 
to go to a gun show and see a LAW rocket for sale or an M16 rifle, 
because they are illegal to possess, those particular items. 

Senator COHEN. OK. 

Mr. Vaughn. You can buy the parts to assemble one, if you 
would like, or to convert an automatic weapon, or the ammunition. 
You can buy machine gun parts at these shows. But on the other 


hand, there are dealers out there that do deal in military hard- 
ware, the weapons themselves. 

Senator COHEN. But that is illegal under existing law, is it not? 

Mr. Vaughn. Correct. 

Senator COHEN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you. 

The attractiveness of military weapons, it seems to me we have 
some 200 million handguns in the country now, so they are readily 
available, as you say. Is the attractiveness of military weapons, is 
it a prestige matter among gang members, and going from a semi- 
automatic to an automatic weapon, is that more prestige than it is 
actual combat requirement on the streets or what? 

Mr. Vaughn. There is some of that Rambo mentality out there, 
but I think in general these individuals buy what is available, 
whatever is presented to them. What they don't buy, they steal. So 
they are going to take what is readily available. 

Senator Cohen. Are there any stolen Humvees out there? 

Mr. Vaughn. Not that I am aware of. 

Chairman Glenn. But there will be one of these days. 

Mr. Vaughn. There could be. 

Chairman Glenn. Just one other question. Mr. Carter, in your 
testimony you say, "a black market network that is across the 
country which buys stolen small arms parts from different National 
Guard units". 

Could you elaborate on that a little? Is this an organized net- 
work, or are you referring just to a general sales pattern across 
country? Is this really an organized effort run by somebody who 
runs a network who does this on an organized basis, or were you 
talking more in general terms? 

Mr. Carter. When it came to wholesale selling of repair parts, 
weapons parts, I dealt with three companies in three separate 
States, California, New Jersey, and Illinois. The organization in Il- 
linois supplies an incredible area of our country. Actually, all three 
of those businesses supply, I don't know, 50 or 60 percent of the 
country when it comes to those parts specifically. 

Chairman Glenn. Does organized crime get into this? Is there an 
organized crime network of weapons parts? 

Mr. Carter. I don't know if the person I dealt with was involved 
with organized crime. That is something that would have to be 
checked out by someone else. He paid cash. He would pay you in 
any way you wanted it. He would have it sent einywhere you want- 
ed it. You send him the parts UPS. He would meet you anywhere 
to buy them, any State. 

Chairman Glenn. Did you have any knowledge of his other con- 
tacts? Were there other people within your National Guard unit 
that he worked with also? Were you aware of any other contacts? 

Mr. Carter. Not through him, not through him, but other associ- 
ates in the Guard and people that I have done business in the past, 
it was common knowledge of who this guy was and who other peo- 
ple were in the business, so to speak. It was well known. 
Chairman Glenn. Thank you. 
Do you have anything else, Senator Cohen? 
Senator Cohen. One final point. Mr. Vaughn, you indicated that 
gang members are actually recruited to go into the military, either 


the Guard or active duty, because of pressure to fill quotas. My un- 
derstanding was we are tr5ring to "downsize" the military and have 
a smaller fighting force, so where is the pressure to allow gang 
members to slip in under the net? 

Mr. Vaughn. Having retired in 1990, the downsizing is a new 
thing, I think, for a lot of people. But when I was in the Guard, 
I had people enrolled in my unit that didn't exist. They virtually 
did not exist. They were taken out of a phone book or created. I 
had criminals in my organizations, in my Guard units, narcotics or- 
ganization, and gang members. 

I always asked myself, how do these people get recruited? How 
do they get in there? During those days, there was a tremendous 
amount of pressure put on recruiters to produce numbers, bodies 
as opposed to qusdified folks. 

On the other hand, there have been members of the military that 
have become involved in gang activity. In the last four or 5 years, 
and of course now that some of these bases are going to be gone 
out of my area and it won't be my problem anymore, but we had 
50 or 60 members of a motorcycle gang that were active members 
of the military living on one post together that we had problems 

Senator COHEN. Kind of a symbiotic relationship between the 
gang members influencing the military and the military influencing 
the gang members? 

Mr. Vaughn. Exactly. My apologies to Mr. Carter. I didn't mean 
my statement to be pointed at him, but there are people whose sole 
purpose is to use the military as a shopping network as opposed 
to those folks who don't really realize some of the things that they 
do when they sell a boxload of small parts. It may be insignificant 
to them but a lot more significant to folks like me that see them 
on the street in the hands of people that shouldn't have them. 

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Glenn. You say you had fake people on the roster, 
people that didn't exist? Did I hear you correctly? 

Mr. Vaughn. That is correct, sir. 

ChairmEin GLENN. You mean they just put a name on the roster? 
What happened when you had drill days and so on? 

Mr. Vaughn. They were counted AWOL for up to 2 years, never 
showed up for their basic induction training, but we had to keep 
them on the books to show that we had a fiill-size military unit. 
We fought that for years and years and years. 

Chairman Glenn. Did somebody get their pay, or what 

Mr. Vaughn. There was no pay because they never showed up. 
They were inducted into the military, they had a name, a social se- 
curity number, but they never showed up for basic training, and we 
carried them AWOL. I reported them AWOL every month. I 
couldn't find them in the State system, I couldn't find them in the 
computer system, no address, no home phone number. Eventually 
we ended up discharging them after approximately 2 years, but it 
kept our military strength reporting up. We had a full-size unit on 
the books. We went through that for years. 

Chairman Glenn. Have you ever seen that, Mr. Carter? 


Mr. Carter. I have seen things Hke that. It was fairly common. 
There is a lot of pressure on commanders to have the numbers 
where they should be as far as people. 

Chairman GLENN. Did you find fake names on there where bod- 
ies didn't exist to match those names? 

Mr. Carter. They would have addresses and phone numbers 
that were a comer somewhere in Detroit, a phone booth, that was 
the address and their phone number, and they would show up long 
enough to get issued a full set of gear, which they would promptly 
take down to the pawn shop and sell, and that was the last you 
ever heard of this person. 

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, we have had stealth fighters but 
now we have phantom soldiers. It is quite revealing. I am sure in 
your Subcommittee on Armed Services you will want to examine 
end strength numbers. 

Chairman Glenn. We do, indeed. We both are on the Armed 
Services Committee, and until just this year I was chairman of the 
Personnel Subcommittee in which we worked very, very hard to try 
and get the Guard and reserve in the proper roles and missions 
and so on. It is very disturbing to hear this. This is something new. 
We had occasional cases, but you are indicating that this was not 
uncommon at all, I gather, is that correct? 

Mr. Vaughn. It was not uncommon for at least the California 
National Guard system, but I think the key, as the Senator ex- 
plained, is that with the downsizing, I think there can now prob- 
ably be an emphasis on quality as opposed to quantity, and I think 
that that will probably eliminate the pressure to recruit to full 

Chairman Glenn. You can hardly measure the quality if the 
quantity is zero. We may want to follow up with you later on and 
follow up on this particular issue. 

We are going to have to move along here. Thank you. We may 
have other questions for you. We would appreciate a response so 
that we can include it in the record. 

Chairman Glenn. The next witness is General Leon Salomon, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Department of the Army. 

General Salomon, we welcome you this morning. 

General Salomon. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. You have heard our testimony this morning. 
I am sure you find it disturbing, as we do. 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Chairman Glenn. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you 
for being here this morning. 


General Salomon. Mr. Chairman, I am Lieutenant General Leon 
Salomon, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Thank you 
very much for the opportunity to appear here today to address the 
General Accounting Office's report on internal controls over small 

With your permission, I have a written statement I would like 
to submit for the record. I will summarize its key points. 


Chairman Glenn. It will be included in its entirety. 

General Salomon. As the GAO testified earlier, they conducted 
a review of small arms parts control at six Army locations, three 
active and three National Guard, between November 1991 and Jan- 
uary 1993. For reasons which I both understand and agree with, 
I have not been provided a copy of the report we are discussing 
today. We got that as the meeting started. However, my staff has 
been briefed on its content. 

Simply put, the GAO found problems. Our internal controls need 
strengthening, management was inattentive, physical security 
lapses were noted, and the automated supply system that was 
operational at the sites GAO visited was vulnerable to abuse. Sir, 
not good news. 

At the outset, let me say that my top and bottom lines are the 
same. The GAO's findings, especially those that indicate an oppor- 
tunity for criminal activity, deeply concern me both as a soldier 
and as a citizen of this great country. The Army needs to improve. 
GAO's recommendations have my full attention, and corrective ac- 
tion will be taken. 

Small arms, such as light machine guns, pistols, rifles, and shot- 
guns are authorized in £dmost every Army unit around the world. 
In fact, we now have over four million small arms in our inventory. 
Most are entrusted to commanders of approximately 19,000 com- 
pany-size units. 

These weapons are made up of many individual parts and assem- 
bles, such as barrels, bolts, buttstocks, hand guards, firing pins, 
and sear springs. Millions of parts must be readily available for the 
repair of these weapons across the entire spectrum of the Army, 
and that includes the battlefield, so that our soldiers' weapons are 
ready when needed. 

Mr. Chairman, for example, the M16A2 rifle alone has 109 dif- 
ferent repair parts. 

Our logistics system, especially at the troop level, must be able 
to support power projection and the rapid deployment of forces to 
and from any place in the world. For example, we sent additional 
troops to Somalia last month. The first increment was an imme- 
diate reaction company from the 24th Division at Fort Stewart. We 
alerted them on Saturday, and by Tuesday they are on the ground 
in Mogadishu with 14 Bradley fighting vehicles, four Abrams 
tanks, 210 soldiers, along with their equipment, ammunition, small 
arms, small arms parts, and computers. 

Today's military mission presents us with the challenge of strik- 
ing a balance between control and the ready availability of needed 
items. On any given day, in addition to our forward deployed 
troops, there are over 20,000 soldiers deployed throughout the 

This Committee knows better than most that America's Army is 
going through a period of massive change, reshaping, and reduc- 
tion. Between 1989 and 30 September of this year, 208,000 active 
and 91,000 reserve soldiers have left the Army. We have reduced 
our troop strength in Europe by 50 percent. 

Sir, despite these challenges, you should not be tolerant of our 
mistakes or relax the standards. I make this point because as 


America's Army is rapidly changing, we welcome another set of 
eyes. The GAO provides those eyes. 

The GAO report signals that we have improvements to make in 
internal controls, automated systems, and physical security. By 
strengthening internal controls, we can improve our inventory 
management, ensure tighter accountability, and reduce the risk of 
theft by those few — I repeat, those few in our force with criminal 

Current Army policy includes many provisions designed to re- 
duce the risk of loss and theft. For example, regulations restrict ac- 
cess to specific parts, limit on-hand quantities, require periodic in- 
ventories, and mandate command review of stockage levels. Army 
regulations gdso require physical security inspection of all arms 
rooms at least every 18 months. 

If an inventory or physical security inspection reveals a loss and 
negligence is suspected or the loss involves a sensitive item, the 
commander must appoint an officer to conduct a complete inves- 
tigation. When criminal activity is suspected, the investigation is 
referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency. 

I am particularly concerned by GAO's findings and believe that 
the Army's retail supply system, which is called SARSS-1 interim, 
is vulnerable to abuse. Corrections to many of the deficiencies 
noted by the GAO are incorporated into an enhanced version of the 
system we are currently fielding. I will closely study this aspect of 
the report to learn how we can improve. 

Since the GAO visit to the six sites discussed in the report, the 
Army has taken corrective actions concerning the deficiencies. The 
Army is implementing a policy that separates the duties of the in- 
dividuEils who inspect and repair the arms from those who main- 
tain the shop stock records. 

At Fort Benning, a separate security cage has been built for the 
storage of small arms parts. The 801st Maintenance Battalion at 
Fort Campbell will move by February 1994 to a facility with a 
vault for sensitive and pilferable small arms parts. 

The National Guard has been conducting unannounced audits of 
small arms parts control since last year. This has also been a key 
area of attention during the Guard's recent logistics review. 

The Army has been focusing £ind will continue to focus the need 
on compliance and internal controls. The Secretary of the Army in 
August 1992 and again in October of this year emphasized the im- 
portance of internal controls to ensure effective management, mis- 
sion accomplishment, and stewardship of public resources. Addi- 
tionally, internal management control checklists as well as com- 
mand supply discipline program checklists require inspection of 
these critical areas. 

Over the past IV2 years, I have spoken to every major Army com- 
mand commander, every corps commander, every division com- 
mander, every brigade commander and battalion commander on 
this subject of internal controls. I will continue to emphasize to 
commanders and supervisors up and down the chain the impor- 
tance of complying with existing policy, focusing on their lawfiil re- 
sponsibility to reduce the risk of mismanagement and criminal ac- 
tivity and taking appropriate and expeditious action. 


Mr. Chairman, the GAO review shows America's Army must im- 
prove. We can, and we will. 

The Army has recognized these problems in its annual assurance 
statement prepared under the Federal Managers' Integrity Act and 
is taking action to correct them. We have been reporting a material 
weakness on our problem with small arms parts in the National 
Guard since 1991. Based on my understanding of this report that 
we are discussing today, I have expanded this material weakness 
to address the issue on an Army-wide basis. 

The Army has also been carrying property accountability as a de- 
partmental weakness since 1989. Our corrective actions increased 
departmental oversights of property accountability trends. 

I have directed my command logistics review team to focus on 
the management of small arms parts at every location they visit 
this year. The Army Inspector General will also be conducting a 
special review of small arms parts this year. Our commanders will 
be directed to place additionsd emphasis on this in their command 
inspection programs. 

I will use the GAO's vulnerability analysis of the Army's interim 
supply system to identify potential enhancements to that system 
and explore the cost effectiveness of further improvements to our 
objective system. The objective system is a real-time system that 
would have prevented many of the noted security breaches. 

Members of the Committee, as you know, the purpose of our lo- 
gistics system is to be agile, supportive, and responsive to our com- 
bat force. We continually strive to find the proper balance between 
responsiveness and control. This report will assist us in realigning 
that balance. 

Sir, our policies must make sense at the soldier level. In making 
policies that balance responsiveness and control, I have always 
been guided by General Eisenhower's observation that farming 
takes on a whole different meaning when a pencil is your plow and 
you are a thousand miles from the field. 

Sir, you have my commitment that the issues surfaced today will 
be resolved. Thanks for the opportunity to appear. I welcome your 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you. General. Thank you very much. 

My first question will be: I think this is fourth report on this spe- 
cific subject over 3y2 years, and we have had the same assurances 
every time we have come out with another report. "We have talked 
to our commanders, we have done this, we have done that, we have 
done something else," and yet it continues. 

I accepted at face value previous assurances of people who sat 
right where you are sitting and said they are going to fix it up, yet 
it seems to me that what we are dealing with here is not new com- 
mand structure, is not new organizations or whatever. It is some- 
thing that instills in people honesty, number one, and a way to find 
out if honesty is not their major trait, some way to find out that 
they are stealing, and that occurs right at the local level. That oc- 
curs when somebody walks out of the warehouse and gets in their 
car to go home at night. 

How do you address it at that level? Is that part of what your 
commanders are going to address? Are we going to have gate 
checks? I hate to keep bring up gate checks, because maybe that's 


so old hat you don't do that anjrmore for whatever reason, but it 
used to work. Is anybody instituting such a commonplace item as 
that these days? 

General Salomon. Sir, in my previous life, I was a post com- 
mander. We did not use gate checks all the time, only when we had 
indicators through our internal controls program that problems 
were going on. So it was a periodic check that we used. Sir, that 
is something we're going to have to look into some more. 

Chairman Glenn, ^e your internal controls good enough to 
know when this is going on? I think that was the point that Mr. 
Carter made, that nobody knew anything about what was going on. 
They had only been audited twice in 10 years. Nobody knows what 
is going on, and with the lists of what material he got, he could 
fake that on the computers and nobody knew the difference. So 
how are you going to know when things are being stolen? 

General Salomon. Sir, with respect to the computer aspect of it, 
that is probably one of the most vexing problems we have in that 
we have designed our logistics system so our direct support units, 
the ones that have these kinds of parts, can provide them to a mul- 
titude of customers. 

So what happens is that if you were in any area and the unit 
was going through it and needed a particular part because of a 
weapon, we are allowed to have what is called a post-post trans- 
action. We issue the item and update the computer later. 

We would have to change our doctrine to get at that kind of situ- 
ation, and that is why I say that is one of our most vexing prob- 
lems that we have. 

I have a command logistics review team. Last year, we went to 
about 52 different areas and inspected physical security areas and 
small arms rooms. Our results were not as bad as what we have 
found on the GAO report. I have to go see if I am checking the 
right thing. I will be up front, sir. We were not specifically looking 
at these six parts that you have seen here. 

Chairman Glenn. I don't want to overblow these into this being 
the be all and end all of the problem. It is not. These six parts are 
used as an example of what is going on, an example that we are 
very concerned about. But I am also concerned, as I indicated, 
about the bigger picture of everjrthing that is going out the front 

You made a major point out of the fact that we have to be re- 
sponsive for emergencies and you are going to Somalia and all of 
that. That is true, but responsiveness doesn't automatically mean 
no accountability, and I am sure you would agree with that state- 

General Salomon. Yes sir, absolutely. 

Chairman Glenn. And accountability goes right along with re- 
sponsiveness, just as much overseas as it does here. I know there 
are going to be losses as you transfer equipment around, and that 
is expected. I am very much aware of that, but I think accountabil- 
ity has to be built into this system wherever we are, in or out of 
the country. That is just as much true in Somalia as it is right 


General Salomon. Sir, I didn't mean to imply that. If I did, I 
apologize. I am trying to talk to what the balance is between the 
responsibility and the control. 

Chairman Glenn. After these previous reports that we had here, 
what was actually done? How long have you been in your job? 

General Salomon. Sir, I have been in the job about a year-and- 
a-half, a little over a year. 

Chairman Glenn. So some of this occurred before you were on 
the job. Do you have a run-down you can give us on what occurred 
starting along back in about 1990 when the first report came out? 
We thought automatically these things were going to be checked 
and that they would all be corrected. Now here we are three more 
reports later and the same situation exists. 

General Salomon. Sir, Red River came up several times during 
the testimony. The information that I have been provided, I think 
there were 39 or so major deficiencies. We are right now, the last 
check I made, 35 of those 39 deficiencies have been corrected and 
we are going into audit to see if the last four 

Chairman Glenn. How about the other bases, though? Have they 
been alerted and the same thing has been taken care of at other 
bases also, not just the ones that were inspected? These were just 
indicators of what is going on in the whole system. 

General Salomon. Yes sir, to put that out — as you know, some 
of the other testimony we had has been involved with inventory 
management and the excess, and that has come down dramatically, 
the excess at both, which is part of this problem, because the more 
excess you have, then these are the kinds of things that have hap- 
pened. The dollar value of that has gone down dramatically at both 
what we say the retail level and in the wholesale level in the Army 
Materiel Command. 

Chairman Glenn. That has been a good move, I might add. We 
pushed that on the Armed Services Committee where all three of 
us serve. Only replace the 65 percent rule, with which I am sure 
you are familiar. 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Chairman Glenn. We only replace 65 percent until we draw our 
stocks down to about a level where they should be instead of some 
of the excesses we have. 

General Salomon. One of the areas, and this is not meant in any 
way as an excuse, right now we are in a process at Anderson Army 
Depot demilling over one million small arms weapons. 

Chairman Glenn. Good job. 

General Salomon. The magnitude of what we have in front of us 
to get this accomplished, it is awesome when you look at those 
numbers and then you add up the parts that are involved that 
must also be demilled and must also be shredded. 

Chairman Glenn. I think the local commanders out there have 
to get on something like this of all kinds of pilfering. I don't know 
whether gate checks or other things, or barracks searches, or what- 
ever are the answer. If it offends somebody, well, that is too bad. 
I was offended when I used to get pulled over once in a while, too. 
But it seemed to me that we didn't have the same kind of problem 


we have now, and maybe you have to take some pretty common- 
place actions hke that and deal very, very harshly with people that 
have government property in their car going off base. 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Chairman Glenn. Senator Cohen? 

Senator Cohen. General, you indicated you made a sweep of a 
number of bases and you didn't find as poor a result as GAO did. 
What kind of investigation were you making? 

General Salomon. Sir, as the desk log, I have what is called a 
command logistics review team and this year, they will go out to 
about 14 different installations. What I base that on is the material 
weaknesses that we have submitted in the Chief Financial Officers 
Act, and one of the areas we wanted to look at was property ac- 
countability and physical security in arms rooms. We aJso have 
checkhsts that have been published for each one of the units to do 
that. So we scoped in on this physical security point of view. 

Now I would be the first to say this is another set of eyes for us. 
We weren't looking into these parts specifically, but we were look- 
ing into the physical security aspects of that. To try and get at that 
some more, as Senator Glenn was mentioning, this is the first year 
we will have the IG looking at this. 

Senator COHEN. What happened when you found deficiencies? 
What did you do? 

General Salomon. Sir, the system is — this is an assistance pro- 
gram — a good question. What we do, I provide that to the local 
commander. That is our policy. And it is up to the local commander 
to take the appropriate action. What I have done personally, be- 
cause I know most all these corps commanders, I then sit down and 
write them a letter to make sure that this has been brought aware 
and is not down inside the staff and the information does not get 
up to them. 

Senator COHEN. Now what happens at this point? Suppose you 
have found particular deficiencies and have written a letter saying. 
Commander, this is the problem we have. Do you go back again to 
find out whether or not he 

General Salomon. Presently we do not, sir. 

Senator Cohen. Don't you think that, at a minimum, what you 
have to do is set the standards and then insist that the base com- 
manders be responsible? 

General SALOMON. Yes sir. 

Senator Cohen, I mentioned before the possibility of going in on 
a sweep and making a real investigation and then holding the base 
commander. Should that be done? 

General Salomon, Sir, that is one thing that we are going to 
have to reconsider, because in the past, we have empowered the 
commanders to do that, to take those appropriate actions. Now we 
have some additional information that we have got to go back and 
look to see if we need to change that policy. 

Senator Cohen. Do you intend to implement some, or all, of the 
GAO recommendations? 

General Salomon, Sir, naturally after we go through the review 
and if there are some points of differences, we will go through that, 
and there is a process for doing that through the Army and the 


Senator COHEN. Were you stunned by the testimony of Mr. 
Vaughn that they have phantom Guardsmen? 

General SALOMON. Yes sir. 

Senator Cohen. Is that a problem that you have ever been aware 

General Salomon. Not in my career, and that is one of the rea- 
sons I came here to sit through it all, because this is a — I think 
you had indicated, and Senator Glenn, it is very helpful to get 
these various types of information, because when you are making 
these policies, all the input that you can get is very, very helpful. 
But the answer to your question is yes, I was stunned. 

Senator COHEN. General, I will just conclude by saying I think 
we all recognize there has been an attitude problem. If you don't 
set the standards at the top, if you don't really insist upon the 
proper attitude at the top, then those at the bottom are going to 
take advantage of the system and exploit it. I would seriously rec- 
ommend that you institute some kind of a system whereby you will 
go in without notice periodically and conduct a base check. 

If you find deficiencies, you should hold that base commander ac- 
countable. He or she should have known about the deficiencies and 
there should be consequences, real consequences, for failing to 
measure up to the standards that will be set. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Glenn. Senator Levin? 

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me commend you again, Mr. Chairman, for your leader- 
ship. This is a very, very disturbing area, and our Chairman has 
performed an important role here, and an important function by in- 
sisting that this problem be solved once and for all. It is awfully 
frustrating for him and for us on the Committee to come back 
again, for I don't know how many times, and basically hear the 
same story from the GAO and the same commitment from the per- 
son sitting in that chair. 

Are you going to take personal responsibility to cure this matter? 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Senator Levin. Do you have any idea how many people have 
been arrested for theft of small arms and small arms parts? 

General Salomon. No sir, I will submit that for the record. 

Senator Levin. Would you do that? 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Senator Levin. And would you also tell us what has happened 
to them? 

General Salomon. Yes sir. 

Senator Levin. If you have had 100 people arrested and 50 peo- 
ple tried and 18 people convicted and what their sentences were, 
would you be specific about that? 

General Salomon. Yes sir. We tried to anticipate that, but you 
have to go out to each individual installation and go back and look 
at the 

Senator Levin. That may be one way of sending a signal to each 
installation as to what we are about here, because obviously this 
is not going to be tolerated. 

General SALOMON. Yes sir. 


Senator Levin. You know, this small arms theft problem reminds 
me a little bit of the Energizer bunny. It just keeps going and going 
and going. We think we finally get someone truly energized to end 
it and it just keeps going on. 

The ramifications here are both fiscal but also physical. The 
parts that get out, as the Chairmein has demonstrated, threaten 
our law enforcement people, threaten our innocent citizens out on 
the street. Our own Army product is out there killing our people, 
not the bad guys, our good guys. 

The other part of it is fiscal. I just came from a meeting of the 
Armed Services Committee on the nomination of the new Secretary 
of the Army, and people are talking about the lack of resources. We 
had a whole bunch of folks yesterday voting against the defense 
budget who are very strong on defense as a protest against the cut 
in the size of the defense budget. 

When we waste resources, as we are wasting them with this kind 
of a situation, we are jeopardizing our very security in terms of 
what we need to be doing with our defense dollars. In addition, as 
the Chairman has pointed out, we end up threatening our own peo- 
ple by the pilferage of parts and equipment which end up upgrad- 
ing a semi-automatic to an automatic, for instance, or a machine 

The Chairman and others on this Committee, I know, are seri- 
ous. I don't know what more can be done, other than to impress 
upon you that seriousness and to require that you get back to the 
Committee with your response to the GAO report. I don't know 
that that has been specifically requested of you, but I am sure that 
£dl of us would want to know. 

You said you are going to sit down with the GAO and go through 
their recommendations. It is your intent to implement all of them, 
but we, I am sure, would like to know what specifically you are 
going to do to implement each one of those. If the Chairman hasn't 
already asked, I am sure that he would not have any problem with 
the request that you get back to us with that. 

Chairman Glenn. That is fine. 

Senator Levin. The key to me is responsibility, yours and the 
commanders on the scene. Something is going to give here. It is 
pretty obvious that something is going to happen that will shake 
up this system dramatically from on high rather than from below, 
unless you folks can figure it out for yourself. The right way to do 
it is for you to figure it out and do it. But if you don't, you are 
going to find some Congressionsd rearrangement of the whole oper- 

We in Congress shouldn't be micro-mginaging. Lord knows, but 
what are our options when year after year after year the GAO 
comes back and tells us almost in the same words as they did pre- 
viously what the problem is. 

I mean, you could almost take this GAO report, when you go 
through it, and see it is the same problem: large and consistent 
problems of small arms parts; number of reported incidences of 
theft; significant circumstantial evidence that they are not isolated 
cases; that the Army has assigned a low priority to depot missions, 
including control and security of inventory items; the Army has 
failed to conduct oversight and monitoring activities. I mean, I 


42 3 9999 05982 924 

think if you compared the report that we got today with the one 
a year or two ago, it is almost word for word the same problem. 

General I don't want to beat up on you too much because I know 
you are trying the best you can, but you have to do better. 

General Salomon. I agree, sir. 

Senator Levin. And finally, I just want to raise one quick point 
with you. You very carefully stated relative to excess inventory 
that the dollar value has gone down, most of that through reevalu- 
ation. In other words, most of the dollar value reduction in inven- 
tory has come just because it has been revalued rather than that 
the physical amount of the inventory has been reduced, and that 
is an area that my Subcommittee has gotten into particularly. The 
full Committee has as well, and we will be proceeding to make in- 
quiry about the excess inventory issue. 

General SALOMON. Yes, I think, sir, I will be over there talking 
to you on this also. 

Senator Levin. I just want to let you know that we are pressing 
forward with that and that everyone should realize that there is a 
big difference between the dollar value of excess inventory going 
down and whether the physical inventory has gone down. We are 
going to press that latter issue with you, and thank you very much. 

General Salomon. Sir, if I could give one response, and please, 
I don't mean this to be as if I am trying to dilute the report, but 
one thing we have to work with the GAO on this, we have a dif- 
ferent opinion on if all of these pgirts have come from a military 
weapons room. Some of our research preliminarily indicates that 
these are also readily available and sold commercially, so we have 
to see how much of that came from 

Senator Levin. That is fair enough. 

General SALOMON. Sir, we have to work with the GAO on that. 

Senator Levin. If you reach a different conclusion, just let us 

Chairman GLENN. Good. That is fine, and I welcome that. I don't 
like sending GAO in once a year or once every 6 months as a 
watchdog here. They make their report and then they are off in a 
vacuum someplace here. I think you should be working together 
with GAO and making suggestions regarding their findings. That 
can help you and vice versa. I don't have any problem at all with 
you working together on this. 

Let me follow up a little bit, though, on what Senator Levin was 
talking about. We went back a bit in the record. In 1986, we had 
a Senate task force on inventory management chaired by then-Sen- 
ator, now Governor of California Pete Wilson. The report came out 
that the Army had incomplete documentation of its inventory and 
inadequate physical security. 

Here we are 7 years later, and every time we try and get into 
an investigation like this, we are told we are trying to micro-man- 
age again. "Why don't we get out of everybody's hair over there and 
let them run their shop?" 

Yet here we sire 7 years later and I personally have been through 
four GAO reports and I don't want to chair a fifth. 

General Salomon. Yes. Right. 


Chairman Glenn. That is my bottom hne on it. I hope you can 
straighten this out. I think we need to commit right now to a hear- 
ing on this sometime next summer or sometime 7 or 8 months from 
now so that we can see what progress is being made. 

Another comment was made also by Senator Levin about our ac- 
counts here. These accounts in the Armed Service Committee are 
very serious. I chair the Readiness Subcommittee and that has all 
the operations and maintenance accounts (O&M). I had to take a 
$2 billion hit on that and I fought that tooth and toenail. 

General SALOMON. I know, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. That is cutting into the readiness of this Na- 
tion's military forces, and I didn't want to do that. We had to do 
that because the O&M accounts are the fast-spending accounts, so 
they do more to balance the budget this year than anything else. 
That is the traditional way. You hit and then you ask the Pentagon 
to request reprogrsunming from us so we can still even keep operat- 
ing. Right now, we are on a $2 billion deficit in those O&M ac- 
counts and can't get the equipment we need. 

At the same time, we see waste like this going on out the door 
that neither you nor I, nor GAO have the foggiest idea have an 
idea of exactly how much is involved. 

But while we use the parts here as an example this morning, 
what may be going off the base in 100 different areas, whether it 
is rope, or hydraulic fluid, or brakes, or tires, or everything else. 
Somehow we have to stop this and return to an attitude where sol- 
diers don't look at government property as their own shopping 
place without having to pay the bill. 

The National Guard issue disturbed me. I hadn't heard that one 
before and I want to look into that one. I am sure you will carry 
that word back to the Pentagon to look into that also. 

We want to work with you on this, but we are going to have £ui- 
other hearing on this. I will commit to that right now. We will 
want to get a status report on what you are doing about this GAO 
report. We will probably have that sometime next summer. 

General I appreciate your being here this morning. 

Greneral Salomon. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. I know it is not pleasant. We appreciate your 
candor on this and look forward to working with you to solve what 
is a very important problem. 

General Salomon. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Glenn. Thank you very much. 

The hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to 
the call of the Chair.] 


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